

## Security-Sector Reform in Developing Countries

An Analysis of the International Debate and Potentials  
for Implementing Reforms with Recommendations for  
Technical Cooperation



Deutsche Gesellschaft für  
Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH

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## **Preface**

For a long time, security problems seemed to be excluded from the development-policy discussion. For Technical Cooperation (TC), however, security-sector reform in developing countries is not a completely new theme. There are many overlaps with security-related issues to be seen in GTZ programmes, such as demobilisation and reintegration programmes for ex-combatants and measures on demining, which GTZ has implemented in various countries – mainly in Africa – since the start of the 1990s.

This theme has grown in significance and, in its substance, taken on new dimensions in the international development-policy discussion and increasingly in Germany in the last few months. A Development Assistance Committee “task force” is preparing a concept, in consultation with the OECD member states, on reforming the security sector. This concept is to be adopted by the end of this year.

In the working group of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development “Development-policy Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management”, the draft of the following study was discussed with members of the working group at the end of May of this year. It was possible to gather valuable inputs.

Conceptual considerations will determine the substantive objective, which should involve above all civil society. The role for TC may, therefore, not necessarily lie in direct and at times not uncontroversial cooperation with the police and army, but in advising and assisting those forces responsible for democratic control in the security sector. In this respect, the study contains a number of implementation possibilities with recommendations for TC.

This is, without any doubt, a theme of great political sensitivity and conflict potential for TC and can be looked upon as a prime example of TC becoming more political. This will become established as a new area of activity when increasing scarcity of funds bring security issues for donors to the fore and partner countries demonstrate more readiness to make the security of civil society more and more a part of the advisory services in development cooperation.

Special thanks go to the author, Dr. Herbert Wulf, Director of the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) for putting this study together and for the many lively discussions with him and his colleagues.

In publishing this study, GTZ would like to make its contribution to this theme, which – since the discussions on the notion of “human security” if not before – has revolved around an all-embracing security concept. This concept embraces not only security from external threat, but also material,

physical and social security as well as protection from bodily harm. These are essential for development work to take place.



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## **List of Abbreviations and Acronyms**

BICC	Bonn International Center for Conversion
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of OECD
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH (Germany)
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
NUPI	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
TC	Technical Cooperation
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

## Summary

1. There are a number of areas today where development policy needs to address the wider issue of security-sector reform. However, since this field is a relatively new theme in Technical Cooperation, it has not yet resulted in a generally accepted and clearly defined programme. In some cases, highly diverse aspects and/or different objectives are envisioned. The core theme of reform is the creation of a professional security sector which is appropriately sized, based on an appropriate use of resources, with a precise mandate and subject to democratic control. A security sector thus structured can make a contribution towards the development of a country, whereas an unreformed security sector can become a burden.
2. When defining security-sector reform and formulating the objectives, the problem arises that too narrow a definition (for instance an exclusive focus on the military) might lead to an inadequate programme, and lead to key issues (increasing security for citizens, appropriate use of resources, civil control) being lost sight of. Conversely, too broad a definition and the inclusion of Technical Cooperation projects already implemented (poverty alleviation, crisis prevention, peacekeeping measures, disarmament, conversion, demobilisation, demining, judicial reform, human rights, governance etc.) might lead to the emergence of an undifferentiated strategy amounting to nothing more than a relabelling of existing projects.
3. Development cooperation's recognition of the fact that it can no longer exclude security issues (as was the case for a long time), but must address them as part of a strategy for sustainable development, does not mean that donor organisations must automatically cooperate closely with actors of the security sector (military, police, the judicial and penal systems). It is a welcome fact that security-sector reform is a current topic of development-policy debate. At the same time, the strict application of development-policy criteria is a precondition for involvement.
4. The results of traditional equipment aid, and military and police assistance, urge us to remain cautious. These measures usually took place in a context of ideological conflict, and involved the supply of modern weapons to armed forces, which often functioned as an opening for arms exports. Security-sector reform cannot be based solely on these experiences. It must apply a significantly more comprehensive strategy that also includes civil society.
5. Security-sector reform encompasses the political dimension (civil control of actors), the economic dimension (consumption of resources for the security forces), the social dimension (actual guarantee of citizens' security) and the institutional dimension (profes-

sionalisation of the security sector and institutional separation of the various actors). All these dimensions possess needs and potentials for reforms, although the first three are more relevant to development cooperation than changes in the internal structure of security-sector actors or their functional differentiation. This means that the major points of departure for Technical Cooperation need not necessarily involve direct cooperation with the armed forces or police.

6. The following measures can be regarded as structural elements of security-sector reform:

**Political dimension:** strengthening of civil society (government and parliament as monitoring, decision-making and control bodies), planning and budgetary control, support and professionalisation of non-governmental organisations and the press.

**Economic and development dimension:** measures to implement disarmament and conversion, demobilisation and reintegration of armed forces, civil utilisation of resources formerly used for military purposes (e.g. immovables).

**Social dimension:** strengthening of public security, including training in the preparation of security-related analyses and the assessment of citizens' security needs. Control of arms transfer, and especially measures to control the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

**Institutional dimension** (not primarily development-oriented and therefore of low priority):

professionalisation and reallocation of functions to the armed forces, training of armed forces in the application of international norms and laws.

7. In cases of doubt, it is appropriate to avoid direct cooperation with security forces, and instead to strengthen and support primarily those elements responsible for democratic control of the security sector. In the long term, support for civilian governments, democratically elected parliaments, civil servants with competences for control, and monitors within civil society will advance security-sector reform more sustainably than military or police assistance that is of a questionable nature. Consequently, emphasising the promotion of good governance (also in and for the security sector) is a key point of departure for reform.

8. The opportunities and potentials for reform in different situations can be measured on a scale. The two poles are formed by countries at war (such as Sudan or Angola), where potentials for security-sector reform are currently limited or non-existent, and countries in post-conflict situations (such as Mali, Sierra Leone and South Africa). Compared to countries at war, countries in areas of tension or so-called failed states, the opportunities for reform are much greater in post-conflict societies, in countries where peace accords have been signed and where possibly even the reduction and adjustment of security forces have been agreed.

9. The security sector is a politically sensitive area. Reform programmes need to take into account a number of dilemmas which are especially relevant here due to the sensitive nature of the security sector, and therefore require closer attention:

- Cooperation with the right partners for reform in the concerned countries. The military, police and judiciary are often discredited on account of their past.
- The coherence of donor country policies. Foreign, security, economic and development policies occasionally conflict (e.g. arms imports versus use of resources for sustainable development). Short-term interests, often motivated by micro-economic concerns, continue to conflict with objectives of sustainable human development.
- The selection of development-policy priorities in the face of scarce funds. Security-sector reform does not necessarily have priority over other development-policy objectives.

10. Recommendations for development cooperation respectively Technical Cooperation (TC) are made for the following six areas: the concept of reform, institutionalising reform, supporting civil society, cooperating with the right partners, professionalising the security forces and overcoming the legacy of war and conflict.

## 1 Introduction

There are a number of areas today where development policy needs to address the wider issue of security-sector reform: the need to achieve appropriate levels of military expenditure, processes of democratisation marking the end of military regimes, efforts to achieve good governance that must also impact on the armed forces, United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions, disarmament, the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction, and programmes to guarantee the internal security of citizens. From a development-policy perspective, all these are potential areas for reform of the security sector, and Technical Cooperation is eminently suitable for concrete projects. Various international actors have become involved – some with major programmes, whilst others have remained more cautious. The key actors are:

**United Nations:** Although security-sector reform is not an explicit United Nations programme in its own right, this aspect does play a role in a number of departments and special organisations. These include the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (and its Lessons Learned Unit), which operate in conflict prevention and demobilisation, the Department of Disarmament Affairs, which seeks to incorporate small arms control into a specific development-policy context, the International La-

bour Organisation (ILO) with its training programmes for ex-combatants, and above all the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), both operating in disaster assistance, and linking disarmament and development projects. These activities build on conceptual work performed not least in the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, which was devoted to the theme of human security.

**DAC/OECD:** An international consensus (among donor countries) concerning the needed reform of the security sector is expressed most clearly in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (DAC/OECD 1998), adopted in May 1998. That document states that the reform of armed forces should contribute to their accountability, professionalisation and civilian control. Thus, according to the document, security-sector reform can play an important role in maintaining peace (DAC/OECD 1998, p. 62). Further to that a task force is currently preparing a strategy for security-sector reform that has been harmonised among the member countries, and which will be presented in 2000. The paper will provide a conceptual framework, arguing in favour of a coordination of

measures among donor organisations and countries. (Interview conducted by the present author at OECD, October 1999; see also Uvin 1999; DAC/OECD 2000).

**World Bank:** Since the early nineties the World Bank has been involved in debates on security policy, through its analyses on the appropriateness of military expenditure. In 1991 the Bank's Supervisory Board adopted guidelines for staff concerning the treatment of military expenditure. This was followed in 1993 by a pilot study on demobilisation. The establishment of the Post-Conflict Unit in 1997 then institutionalised the treatment of themes such as demobilisation and security-sector reform. World Bank President James Wolfensohn strongly emphasised its significance: "Security is a critical development issue and the Bank needs to more explicitly recognize it and integrate security concerns into policies and programs, developing an ability to respond. There are many ways to do this" (cited in: Bigombe 1999, p. 1). In spite of this clear signal, how these themes are actually addressed within the Bank remains a matter of interpretation of the mandate. In many country sections in particular, security-sector reform is far from being addressed as a core theme.

**European Union:** Stimulated by the broad international debate now emerging, the European Union (EU) is also addressing the theme of security-sector reform in development co-operation. A recent publication (Chalmers 2000) documents the current projects and activities of the EU, and proposes guidelines

for a future EU policy. The study makes clear that within the EU (as in the various departments and special organisations of the United Nations) there is no explicit "security sector" reform programme. Efforts are rather being made to include existing programmes and projects under this heading.

**UK:** Of all the bilateral and multilateral donor organisations and countries, the British Government has most clearly placed security-sector reform at the heart of its development policy. Whereas previously the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office were solely responsible for addressing security issues, the Blair Government included the Department for International Development (DFID) in a general security-policy review. This has been clearly reflected in British development policy projects (Ball 1998; Hendrickson 1999). The present status and future outlook of the programme were evaluated at a symposium held in London in mid-February 2000 (Short 2000; DFID 2000a; DFID 2000b).

Other bilateral donor countries, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and various regional organisations are also addressing specific aspects of the broader issue of security. The German, Japanese and Netherlands Governments for instance became involved relatively early on in the debate on the scope of military expenditure in the development-policy context – a core aspect of today's debate on security-sector reform. Various countries are involved in demobilisation programmes, in small arms control, in demining projects, and in other

projects affecting the security sector. Furthermore, in a number of countries crisis prevention is a key focus of development-policy debate – again with clear links to the military and security-sector context. Having said that, these projects are only seldom *expressis verbis* integral components of comprehensive security-sector reform.

The pursuit of security-sector reform by actors in the affected countries and by international donors is of course motivated not only by development policy concerns, but also by issues of defence and security policy. A number of governments of industrialised countries for instance are conducting programmes of active military assistance, which in some cases are also influencing the restructuring of armed forces in the recipient countries. There are now also private contractors offering to deliver inputs to the restructuring or modernisation of armies. Key objectives in programmes of this kind are greater efficiency, professionalisation and increased combat strength of the armed forces in question. By contrast, security-sector reform as measured by criteria of development policy has other objectives: To optimise the structure and capabilities of actors in the security sector for social, economic and political development (see chapter 2.1 in this connection).

The present paper emphasises the breadth of the approach to security-sector reform, pointing out that there is still no generally acknowledged and accepted strategy (see chapter 2.1 and chapter 2.2 in this connection). The analy-

sis focuses on addressing the potentials (and constraints) for external actors of Technical Cooperation. It goes without saying that, whilst security-sector reform can be supported by external actors, it cannot be implemented without the local actors playing a lead role. The present analysis does not explore in detail other aspects of the theme, such as reform without the involvement of external actors or Technical Cooperation, but merely touches on them occasionally. The analysis contained in this paper is confined exclusively to developing countries.

To avoid misunderstandings it should be expressly stated at this point that, whilst it is a welcome development that donor organisations are addressing the theme of security-sector reform, this should not automatically mean that they become involved in all reform programmes. The consequences of such involvement should be carefully examined on a case-by-case basis. It also remains to be considered – in view of the scarcity of funds – which priorities are to be set in Technical Cooperation. Depending on the political and economic conditions which prevail, the security of people can possibly be strengthened more effectively through indirect measures (such as the strengthening of civil society, or demobilisation and reintegration programmes) than through direct involvement with the armed forces or in police reform.

*The Historical Perspective*

During the nineties – and especially the late nineties – the development debate focused increasing attention on issues of military and security policy. The nineties were not, however, the first period during which development theoreticians and practitioners had turned their attention to these themes. Back in the sixties – partially brought about by a large number of military coups d'état in Latin America, Africa and Asia – the development community was interested in helping identify an appropriate role for the military, the input of resources for the military sector and related themes. The debate focused on

- the consumption of resources by the military, and the issue addressed in various UN reports of whether those resources should be employed for other purposes. Policymaking objectives and empirical analyses focused on the wastage of resources.
- the role of the military in nation-building. Development theoreticians put forward the hypothesis that, in view of the often artificial borders drawn up in the decolonisation process, the military might play a role in uniting people and building nations.
- the role of the military as a pillar of modernisation. Anglo-Saxon sociologists and political scientists in particular viewed the military as a key group for a modernisation and industrialisation of emerging third-world societies. In so doing they provided the legitimisation for extensive military assistance programmes.

What had previously been a predominantly positive image of the military as modernisers had changed by the late sixties, if not before, when the predicted rapid development failed to materialise, and the military in many countries had become anything but pillars of growth and development. The more empirical analyses of the seventies focused more closely on the causes of coups d'état and the consequences of policies pursued by military governments. Development cooperation – primarily in response to the negative role of the undemocratic, often repressive and state-terrorist armed forces – proceeded to keep its distance from these themes. The role of the military and the absorption of resources by the military came to be seen as a highly sensitive area which was too political, and was therefore removed from the limelight.

The low level of support for security-sector reform to date is attributable to the fact that Technical Cooperation programmes geared to the security sector have been viewed as support for the military. This aloofness from the military was problematic in that military assistance and other forms of cooperation with the armed forces in the third world was left largely or in most cases exclusively to the armed forces in the industrialised countries. These activities then took place in the context of the confrontation between East and West and the competition between the respective systems, the Southern dimension of which also impacted on developing countries.

The support provided to third-world countries by the USSR was founded almost exclusively on arms exports, and training for the armed forces or underground movements. Yet in countries like the USA and France too, where military assistance was declared as development cooperation, in purely quantitative terms military assistance at times dominated development cooperation. The focus was on military training and the supply of weapons, whilst the issue of what might be the appropriate role of the military in society in general, and the development process in particular, received little or no attention. In both the East and the West, rationales were sought to justify this support to the armed forces, and it took the end of the Cold War to bring themes involving military and security policy back into the mainstream of development policy debate.

## 2 What do we mean by “security-sector reform”?

### 2.1 Definition and scope of a new concept

Since it is a relatively new theme in development cooperation, security-sector reform still has no generally accepted and clearly defined programme. In some cases, highly diverse aspects and/or different objectives are envisioned. A paper prepared by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) on behalf of OECD for instance focuses on reform of the police, and the judicial and penal systems – these being termed the triad of security-sector reform – whilst military and paramilitary organisations are mentioned only peripherally (NUPI 1999). Norwegian experiences in the Palestinian territories evidently had a strong influence on that analysis and the recommendations put forward.

The point of departure for security-sector reform programmes is recognition of the fact that an unreformed security sector is barely able to prevent violent conflicts, or may even contribute to their flaring up and escalating. Without reform, scarce funds will continue to be misdirected, post-conflict reconstruction will be constrained, and the gates will be flung open to corruption. The experiences of the United Nations and a number of non-governmental organisations in Mali demonstrated that the creation of security is prerequisite to sustainable development. Several UN Missions which visited Mali and its neighbouring countries in 1994 and 1995 in response to requests by the President of Mali,

and on behalf of the UN Secretary-General, recommended reforming the police, national guard, gendarmerie and customs authority with international assistance, in order to then be able to put a stop to the transfer of small arms. This strategy became known under the catchphrase “security first”, and prompted a broad international debate on the relationship between security and development (Poulton and Youssouf 1998). This debate demonstrates that “security first” cannot mean solving security problems first, and only then moving on to implement development programmes. The

#### *The Need for Reform in Nigeria*

“The obstacle to progress that an unreformed security sector can represent is clearly evident in Nigeria, the largest ACP country, and the key to the security and development of West Africa as a whole. Since the Biafran war in the late 1960s, Nigeria has avoided the large-scale armed conflict that has engulfed states such as Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Its failure to achieve sustainable economic development, however, has continued to leave it vulnerable to regional and ethnic conflict. At the heart of Nigeria’s problems has been its inability to create an accountable and effective security sector. Decades of corruption, led by the military forces that have governed the country for most of the period since independence, have crippled the economy of this oil rich country, and led to increasing despair amongst Western donors...”

Source: Chalmers 2000, p. 7.

“security first” concept integrates security problems into development cooperation as part of a strategy for sustainable development, and seeks to avoid excluding it (as was common practice for a long period).

Most analyses, and the projects implemented to date, take into account a broad range of actors responsible for the security of a state and its citizens.

**Essentially, this view can be summarised**

**as follows:** The security sector includes the armed forces, paramilitary units, the police and gendarmerie, and the intelligence services. But above all it also includes the civil authorities mandated to control and oversee those agencies. And it includes the judicial and penal systems, as well as civil society in general, which also plays a significant role in democratic control. Security-sector reform is part of a governance reform programme.

For many of the aforementioned international organisations and governments, a further point of departure and prerequisite for security-sector reform is one of the basic convictions of development policy - poverty alleviation. This core objective of development cooperation cannot be implemented successfully without a minimum degree of security. An official declaration issued by the British Government concerning its commitment to security-sector reform provides the following explanation: “Concern about insecurity is a strong concern of the poor. Evidence from participatory poverty assessments shows that wherever

people’s basic physical security is threatened (whether by public or domestic violence, civil conflict or crime) dealing with this problem is seen by the poor as an over-riding priority. ... It must be clear both that reform will help poor people, and that there is a genuine commitment to reform in the country in question.” (DFID 1999, p. 1 and 2).

A definition that can be used to help identify concrete projects is contained in the new OECD paper OECD (DAC/OECD 2000, p. 9): “... The security sector is defined as encompassing a) state institutions which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion (e.g. the armed forces, the police, the intelligence services and similar bodies); and b) the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight of these institutions (e.g. Parliament and the Executive).”

## **2.2 The risks associated with an imprecise view**

The World Bank’s commitment to greater security is based on the following assumptions:

- This century is likely to see increased numbers of internal crises and violent conflicts.
- The proliferation of light weapons is both a symptom and a cause of increased insecurity. Criminal activity and violence in post-conflict societies often reflect the lack of opportunities for former fighters.

- A coherent and comprehensive policy towards security-related issues (for instance excessive military expenditure) is required in order to guarantee human security.
- The work of donor organisations on practical disarmament should be seen in the broader framework of human security-related programmes such as community policing and judicial and penal reform.
- Just as AIDS, the environment and corruption have become development issues, so human security issues should take a more central place on the development agenda. (Ian A. Johnson, Vice President of the World Bank in the Foreword to: World Bank 1999.)

When defining security-sector reform and formulating the objectives, the problem arises that too narrow a definition (for instance an exclusive focus on the military) might lead to an inadequate programme. This because security-sector reform is not just about disarmament or reducing the size of the army, but also about security in the wider sense. To be more precise: It is about the security of every single human being within society, and about human security. Conversely, too broad a definition (as expressed in the above-mentioned World Bank points) might create a lack of clarity concerning the core of the needed reforms.

A further risk, towards which there is a very clear tendency today, is the inclusion of all Technical Cooperation projects pursued to date which might “somehow” also fit under

*Human Security*

“The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace... No provisions that can be written into the Charter will enable the Security Council to make the world secure from war if men and women have no security in their homes and their jobs.”

Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 1994, New York, p. 3.

the heading “security-sector reform”: poverty alleviation, crisis prevention, peacekeeping measures, disarmament, conversion, demobilisation, demining, judicial reform, respect for human rights, governance etc.. Thus an undifferentiated strategy might arise encompassing almost all areas of Technical Cooperation, but amounting to nothing more than a relabelling of work to date. A tendency of this kind is evident in the paper presenting the EU perspective, where an attempt is made under the heading “recent activities” to demonstrate, using empirical material, how much has already been done in the past by the EU and its member states to promote security-sector reform (Chalmers 2000, p. 9ff).

It has already been pointed out that the supply of materials and equipment, and military and police assistance, can also be part of a programme of security-sector reform. Having said that, one precondition for this kind of Technical Assistance would be that it was integrated

into an overall strategy. The military assistance programmes implemented during the Cold War, which were essentially ideologically motivated, did not as a rule comply with the concept of security-sector reform in use today, since they aimed merely to strengthen or modernise the armed forces in question and consolidate the influence of the donor countries. But they did not seek to help establish a democratically controlled security sector that would be conducive to development.

*Military Assistance*

“The emerging development approach to security-sector reform is manifestly different from the ideologically-inclined and technocratic approaches that typified Cold War military assistance programmes. First, security sector reform is conceptualised squarely within the context of efforts to consolidate and to promote human rights and good governance. Second, there is recognition of the need for a much higher degree of local ownership of the process than previous military aid programmes that were largely based on Western models, strategies and doctrines for organising and managing security forces.”

Source: DAC/OECD 2000, p. 9 – 10.

The materials and equipment assistance, and military and police aid, provided to date have in some cases led to problematic results. Some programmes had to be discontinued for this reason, whilst others helped strengthen the police and military who nevertheless continued to violate human rights, or organised coups and seized power. According to information made available by the German Government in

1995, between 1985 and 1995 the German side provided financial assistance of DM 120 million to 31 states, within the scope of country-specific materials and equipment assistance for police forces. In the period from 1995 to 1998, this was followed by the conclusion of new agreements with 41 countries worth DM 166.3 million. These figures do not include materials and equipment assistance to foreign armed forces, for which budgetary funds of just under DM 150 million were appropriated between 1992 and 1998. Compared to other Western countries, this is a low figure.

The main recipient countries of German assistance were Algeria, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Somalia, Tunisia, Turkey and Zimbabwe. Further to that, between 1985 and 1995 training assistance (worth DM 30 million) was also provided to Argentina, Cyprus, Portugal, Syria, Thailand and Venezuela. The new countries incorporated after 1995 included Albania, Belarus, Macedonia, the Palestinian Territories, Romania, Russia and Ukraine. Primarily responsible for implementation of the police assistance were the German Federal Border Police, the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation, and the police authorities of the German Federal States. One look at the domestic situation in a number of the aforementioned countries today reveals how problematic that support was. (*Woche im Bundestag*, Issue 8/05.05.95, Issue 13/05.07.95, Issue 10/30.05.96). The Coalition Agreement between the German Social Democratic Party and Alliance 90/The Greens

of 20 October 1999 announced a review of the existing programmes of military materials and equipment assistance, and a moratorium on the conclusion of further agreements in this sector. By resolution of the Budget Committee of the German Bundestag, no new funds were then appropriated for 1999/2000. However, the question arises of whether corresponding funds will be required in future for military and police assistance within the scope of a comprehensive strategy for security-sector reform.

We should also beware of another possible misunderstanding. Extending our understanding of the term “security”, which originally was often understood as military-based security, to embrace human security and the interest in the security sector from a development-policy angle, does not mean that the role of the armed forces should automatically be extended to include secondary tasks. On the contrary: Threats to security, for instance as a result of environmental degradation, do not mean that the military should be mandated to protect the environment. We should rather beware of a militarisation of society. On the other hand, it has been demonstrated in a range of situations, such as during the flood disaster in Mozambique in early 2000, that the military are quite capable of implementing swift and “non-military” measures to protect and save human lives. It is a welcome fact that security-sector reform is a current topic of debate. It would be equally desirable that the “secondary” role of the military also be discussed.

**In summary, the following can also be concluded:** The core theme of reform is the creation of a professional security sector on an appropriate scale, based on an appropriate deployment of resources, with a precise mandate and subject to democratic control. A security sector thus structured can make a contribution towards the development of a country.


As with development cooperation in general, it also applies in the case of security-sector reform that locally and regionally appropriate strategies are required, and of course that general blueprints applicable to every situation are not available.

### 3 Dimensions, Goals and Priorities of Security-Sector Reform

Security-sector reform encompasses the political dimension (the civil control of actors), the economic dimension (the consumption of resources for actors), the social dimension (the actual guarantee of security for citizens) and the institutional dimension (the professional structure of the security sector and institutional separation of the various actors) (Brzoska 1999).

All these dimensions possess needs and potentials for reforms, although the first three are more relevant to development cooperation than changes in the internal structure of security-sector actors or their functional differentiation. This means that the major points of departure for Technical Cooperation do not involve direct cooperation with the armed forces or police. These relationships are illustrated in diagram 1.

**Diagram 1: Security-Sector Reform**



#### 3.1 Civil Control

Good governance is one of the core tasks of reform. Civil control and oversight of security-sector actors is prerequisite to those actors playing a constructive role geared to the goals

of sustainable development. The basic preconditions for democratic control include procurement authorities independent of the armed forces and the police, budgetary control by parliament and thus the creation of transparency, accountability of the top ranks of the armed forces vis-à-vis a democratically elected civilian government, an independent judiciary etc.

In many countries, however, these norms conflict with the traditions and practices of the military. At the same time, these norms geared to the Western model of democracy are overstressing the political system and the civil institutions in many developing countries. The armed forces often operate highly autonomously in a non-transparent fashion, and usurp the role of judge of political and social developments. In many cases they elude civil oversight. It is correspondingly difficult to win over the armed forces as partners for reform.

Yet transparency also requires that information on the security sector be available to civil society. Both the armed forces and especially the intelligence services tend to keep as much information as possible secret. Without a doubt there are grounds for not making all information public, but treating it as confidential. This does not, however, apply to basic information on the size and structure of the security sector, its tasks, the resources it consumes etc. – information that should be avail-

able to both a civilian government and to civil society. In a democratic society, civil society plays an important role in monitoring the development of security policy, and the activities of the various actors in this sensitive sector. Yet it is not just transparency and information which are at issue, but also jurisdiction over the security sector, which in democratic societies is in the hands of civilian bodies. At the same time, the support of a questioning and well-informed civil society offers the military a legitimacy which might benefit it in the performance of its functions.

*Civil Society and Security-Sector Reform in Sierra Leone*

Many civil society organisations in Sierra Leone express their views on the government's plan to include members of the former armed forces – which had mutinied in May 1997 – in the new armed forces that the government began to establish in 1998. Their opposition forced the government to confront the fact that the armed forces have been thoroughly discredited in the eyes of many Sierra Leone citizens and to promote a national dialogue between the remnants of the armed forces and civil society.

Source: Ball 1999, p. 5.

### **3.2 Consumption of Resources**

Expenditure on the security sector (and especially its military segment) remains especially problematic, both from the perspective of general political trends, and from an economic perspective. An excessive military and security apparatus deprives sustainable development of scarce resources. Yet above and beyond this

aspect, the World Bank emphasises that adopting a view of the military as “unproductive” and “corrupt” falls short of the mark. For reform of the security sector subject to democratic control it may well be necessary to increase the volume of (financial, human and material) resources employed. It is necessary to focus attention on the institutions responsible for budgetary decisions (World Bank 1999, p. 11). Identifying the right degree, the correct structure and the appropriate list of tasks for the security sector, and guaranteeing a correspondingly optimal allocation of resources, is therefore a central task of reform. In specific cases this may also mean finding more funds for an effective security sector. The call often made to reduce the volume of resources consumed by the military in order to make funds available for development, is wide of the mark. Security-sector reform does not automatically mean reduction.

The end of the Cold War created new opportunities for reform. In many regions of the world, significant adjustments have been made to military budgets, armed forces and weapons arsenals, even though these have often generated additional costs (at least in the short term). Having said that, many of these opportunities for adjustment in the security sector have been missed, due to the large number of armed conflicts that have taken place. Resistance within the armed forces to demobilisation or cuts in the military budget is understandable, because privileges have been taken away from military personnel, without them always having

been offered prospects outside the armed forces. In some cases resistance among the military elite, for instance to cuts in the military budget, has been and continues to be supported by external actors who fail to demand accountability concerning the military or security-related aspects of the budget when engaging in lending, in development cooperation or in business transactions.

*Military Budget in Zimbabwe*

“The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is covering the bulk of the cost for our military involvement in the DRC, which includes fuel, transport, and ammunition. The outlays borne directly by Zimbabwe’s budget were limited to US \$1.3 million per month in 1998, or 0.4 percent of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) at an annual rate... As in 1998, any excess spending over appropriation for 1999 will be met through enforced savings in the military budget...”

Memorandum on the Economic Policies of the Government of Zimbabwe for 1999 to the IMF, quoted in Ball 1999, p. 12.

### 3.3 Security

The prime task of the security sector and its actors is to guarantee the internal and external security of citizens. This kind of security is not identical with military security. Traditionally, military-oriented security has sought to defend a country's territory against attack from beyond its borders. In developing countries, however, this understanding of security has been undermined in two ways: First of all, in many countries the armed forces are far from wishing merely to guarantee the safety of na-

tional territory and the state. They have often – like the military in other countries – actively taken part in offensive warfare, even though this is always disputed by the actors concerned. Secondly, the armed forces have even more often usurped functions within society. These activities have ranged from coups to genocide, from the appropriation of resources to self-enrichment by corrupt means, and from the terrorisation of citizens to control of the political process. Public security can only be guaranteed through reforms which ensure that the actors of the security sector are appropriately equipped, trained and deployed for the task in hand - and only that task. These reforms must also enable the population to gain confidence and trust in the security sector.

Above all, security-sector reform means guaranteeing human security. In most cases this new allocation of tasks will entail restrictions on, or a reorientation of, the role played by the security-sector actors (which means not just the military and the police). Security, however, is not exclusively an objective state, but is also a question of perception and emotions. In view of the large number of violent conflicts, and the history of violations committed by the armed forces, police, and the judicial and penal systems, establishing the trust and confidence needed to generate subjective feelings of security is often a long-term process.

*Objectives of Democratic Reform in the White Paper on Defence of the Republic of South Africa*

- National security shall be sought primarily through efforts to meet the political, economic, social and cultural rights and needs of South Africa's people, and through efforts to promote and maintain regional security.
- South Africa shall pursue peaceful relations with other states.
- South Africa shall adhere to international law on armed conflict and to all international treaties to which it is party.
- The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) shall have a primarily defensive orientation and posture.
- South Africa is committed to the international goals of arms control and disarmament. It shall participate in, and seek to strengthen, international and regional efforts to contain and prevent the proliferation of small arms, conventional armaments and weapons of mass destruction.
- South Africa's force levels, armaments and military expenditure shall be determined by defence policy which derives from an analysis of the external and internal security environment, which takes account of the social and economic imperatives of the Reconstruction and Development Programme.
- The SANDF shall be a balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced military force, capable of executing its tasks effectively and efficiently.
- The functions and responsibilities of the SANDF shall be determined by the Constitution and the Defence Act.
- The primary role of the SANDF shall be to defend South Africa against external military aggression. Deployment in an internal policing capacity shall be limited to exceptional circumstances and subject to parliamentary approval and safeguards.
- The SANDF shall be subordinate and fully accountable to Parliament and the Executive.
- The SANDF shall operate strictly within the parameters of the Constitution, domestic legislation and international humanitarian law. It shall respect human rights and the democratic political process.
- Defence policy and military activities shall be sufficiently transparent to ensure meaningful parliamentary and public scrutiny and debate, insofar as this does not endanger the lives of military personnel or jeopardise the success of military operations.
- The SANDF shall develop a non-racial, non-sexist and non-discriminatory institutional culture as required by the Constitution.
- The composition of the SANDF shall broadly reflect the composition of South Africa.
- The SANDF shall respect the rights and dignity of its members within the normal constraints of military discipline and training.

Excerpt from Nathan 1999.

### 3.4 Professionalisation and Allocation of Functions

One of the elements of reform concerns the role of the security forces. This aspect of reform should not, however, be at the centre of development efforts. Military or police assistance programmes will presumably be implemented more efficiently by military and police institutions. But in each individual instance it must be guaranteed that they comply with the criteria of development cooperation. (This aspect will be dealt with again in chapter 4 “Problems and Dilemmas”). A further reason for the need to carefully assess direct development cooperation with actors of the security sector is the fact already mentioned above that security-sector reform often has objectives that go beyond those of development cooperation. This applies above all to the rationalisation and modernisation of armed forces. This objective often conflicts or competes with development-policy goals.

Often the armed forces, the police, and the judicial and penal systems are completely discredited due to their role in internal conflicts. Nevertheless they should often also form part of the reformed security sector, especially since qualified staff are usually scarce. In other cases, armed forces and underground armies formerly hostile to one another should be integrated. This part of the reform process is often the most difficult and problematic. The spectrum of reform tasks ranges from the development of a new doctrine, through democratisation of the security sector and on to functional differentiation (separation of the armed

forces, police and paramilitary units and allocation of functions). Training for certain tasks (e.g. for assignment on UN peacekeeping missions), the technical modernisation of armed forces, internal democratisation, role orientation (respect for human rights and other international norms), acceptance of civil control etc. are among the measures of reform which are necessary, though not automatically accepted from the outset.

#### *Including Former Police in El Salvador*

The El Salvadorian case demonstrates the problems with including members of old police structures into a new democratic police force (PNC). The new PNC included personnel with no previous police training, retrained personnel from the old police structures, as well as two special units that were transferred directly into the PNC. Of these groups, those without any previous training performed best, according to their UN-advisors because they, unlike the units they replaced, were committed to carry out effective investigations. Transferring already existing units proved to be highly problematic: these units performed badly, and some of their members were engaged in criminal activities.

Source: NUPI 1999, p. 23.

### 3.5 Points of Departure for Reforms

It is very difficult to generalise on the nature and the needed steps of security-sector reform, since the respective political, economic and social conditions, as well as the regional constellations, need to be taken into account. Nevertheless, an attempt will be made here to

identify a number of general conditions and draw corresponding conclusions. A central prerequisite for the successful implementation of reforms is the will to reform on the part of various relevant partners in developing countries, although equally important is the situation in which the respective country finds itself.

The opportunities and potentials for reform in different situations can be measured on a scale. The two poles are formed by countries at war (such as Sudan or Angola), and countries in post-conflict situations (such as Mali, South Africa and Sierra Leone).

It goes without saying that, where war and violent conflicts are being pursued, there is no will for reform. On the contrary, the belligerent parties usually attempt to strengthen their martial potential in order to defeat the enemy. Reforms to introduce civil control of the military, the growing influence of civil society or demobilisation and disarmament cannot be expected in countries at war, or can be expected only on a limited scale. Nevertheless,

this is the very situation in which civil society is needed as a watchdog or whistleblower. Plans for later programmes of demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration can already be drawn up during the conflict. Corresponding support measures are entirely possible.

Similarly problematic is the situation in areas of tension and countries with a high probability of war. In these countries, there is usually a process of armament followed by mobilisation of the armed forces, whereupon civil norms cease to apply. This cannot be termed an allocation of resources geared to sustainable development. External support is usually accepted by a government only to support its own war effort. In such cases, however, it is also conceivable that support be focused on civil society. Here too it is necessary to seek paths and support structures which strengthen human security.

Poor preconditions for comprehensive security-sector reform also prevail in so-called “failed” or “collapsed” states. Characteristic of this development is the loss of state control

Diagram 2: Scale of Potentials for Security-Sector Reform



over the monopoly on coercion. In such situations, reforms of the apparatus of legitimate state coercion are virtually impossible. Somalia is a prototypical instance of such situations; the fragmentation of the individual militarily active groups and warlords demonstrates that groups are only willing to be disarmed under favourable conditions (for instance where alternative economic prospects are created). However, the preconditions are not in place for fundamental security-sector reform.

Potentials are more conducive in countries where conflict mediation is under way, and where chances for solving or containing conflicts are good. However, there is often not sufficient mutual trust to be able to embark on comprehensive reforms during the conflict mediation phase. It is therefore important to plan and if possible reach agreement on security-sector reforms during the phase of cease-fire and peace negotiations (as was the case for instance in the 1992 Rome Accord for Mozambique).

In those developing countries in transition to peace, the prospects for reform are also good. However, resistance by the armed forces must usually be anticipated here. The inertia of the armed forces and their tendency to adhere to traditional structures constrain needed reforms. This position within the armed forces does not necessarily mean an irrational or illogical opposition to reform on the part of the actors concerned, but can be explained by the threatened loss of privileges by the security elite. External support to the elements for reform (usually

civil society, but possibly also elements within the armed forces themselves) can help actually kick-start reforms.

In contrast to countries at war, potentials in post-conflict societies, where peace accords have been signed and where possibly even the reduction and adjustment of security forces have been agreed, are very positive indeed. Generally speaking, in such countries there is also a strong will to accept external support for reorientation and reform.

### **3.6 Structural Elements for Reform**

It has already been pointed out that there are neither blueprints for security-sector reform, nor are empirical experiences to date comprehensive enough to permit generally applicable conclusions at this point. Consequently, a number of structural elements for reform will be identified here, although this does not yet constitute a model for future programmes.

The broad debate on civilian-military relations also has implications for “security-sector reform” that have practical consequences for projects of Technical Cooperation (Bland 1999). A first problem is described by Huntington as the praetorian problem: the need to limit the political power of the military. A second problem is the need for disciplined armed forces, since an undisciplined mob of armed individuals can be ruinous for society. Thirdly there is a problem of mutual control: the military must be subject to civil control, yet at the same time the military must also be

protected against politicians who might misuse them for personal or party political reasons. Fourthly and finally, all governments face the problem associated with “modern” armed forces: the expertise of civil control bodies. How can a civilian government, which often lacks professional military or security expertise and experience, manage a professional military apparatus?

These questions, developed in context for armies, also apply without exception to security-sector reform. A comprehensive strategy for security-sector reform must address all four levels: control of the military, the establishment of disciplined, professional security forces, and the professionalisation of the government and civil society in general.

With particular reference to its own tasks and mandate, the World Bank emphasises transparency and management in the security sector, as well as the potentials of donor organisations and countries, and expressly identifies the following programmes:

- Development of civilian expertise for assessing security needs and security threats, setting security policy, and effectively managing and overseeing the security sector.
- Training for civil servants in developing control and accounting systems for budgets and expenditure planning.
- Support for democratically elected parliaments to assess security issues.
- Reform of the judicial, legal and penal systems.

- Strengthening of the capacity of civil society to monitor these reforms.

The support which the Bank suggests that the donor community provide includes:

- Human rights training for security forces;
- Strengthening of the democratic accountability of security forces by encouraging dialogue between politicians, security forces and civil servants;
- Support for effective management and accountability of military expenditures. (World Bank 1999, p. 12).

According to a speech held by Clare Short (British Secretary of State for International Development) the reform programme of the British Government, i.e. the programme most systematically developed to date, contains the following seven priorities:

- (1) The integration of a security-sector reform perspective into the British development cooperation programme and into the thinking of other donors and multilateral development organisations;
- (2) The securing of partnership programmes with the United Nations and regional and sub-regional organisations (such as the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS) to address conflict and security issues, and to help strengthen the organisational capacities of those organisations;
- (3) Training in international humanitarian and human rights law for members of the military in developing countries;

- (4) International efforts to ban the recruitment and deployment of child soldiers;
- (5) Activities to reduce the proliferation of small arms and light weapons;
- (6) The reduction of excessive or inappropriate military expenditure;
- (7) The expansion of support for building up the peacekeeping and peace support capacity of the armed forces of developing countries (Short 1999).

Other statements made by the British Government deal with individual projects and support measures in more detail, although these publications do make clear that in the UK too there is still no clear and definitive concept of security-sector reform.

The various levels for security-sector reform projects have been systematically further developed by Nicole Ball for the British Government (Ball 1998, Section 2) and by Malcolm Chalmers in his analysis for the European Union (Chalmers 2000, Section 2). These analyses recommend focusing on nine categories of activity:

- Building the capacity of security-sector organisations to perform their legitimate functions;
- Strengthening civilian management and control;
- Fostering respect for human rights and the rule of law within security-sector organisations;
- Strengthening the capacity of civil society to perform monitoring functions;

*Areas for Development Assistance*

Enhancing state capacity and policy coherence:

- a) Security sector reviews
- b) Management of security expenditure
- c) Civilian expertise on security issues
- d) Regional confidence-building and peace-keeping capacity

Reform and training of security forces:

- a) Military and police reforms
- b) Training assistance

Demilitarisation and peace-building:

- a) Conversion of security resources to civilian use
- b) Demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants
- c) Regulation of small arms
- d) Child soldiers

Strengthening democratic governance and the rule of law:

- a) Justice systems
- b) Civil society

Building research capacity in developing countries

Source: DAC/OECD 2000, p. 21 – 26.

- Fostering the transparency of security-sector and budget management;
- Promoting regional confidence-building mechanisms;
- Technical Assistance for the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants;
- Tackling the proliferation of small arms;
- Incorporating security-sector reform into political dialogue.

Another convincing categorisation containing a similar breakdown was selected in the DAC/OECD Forum (DAC/OECD 2000, Section 5). The DAC/OECD analysis also includes the issue of child soldiers, and men-

tions as a special category the establishment of research capacities in developing countries (DAC/OECD 2000, p. 26).

In the debate to date and in project practice, both constraints to and potentials for security-sector reform (and for the involvement of external actors) have been identified. In summary, the following structural elements can be identified as the core of security-sector reform – with reference to the aforementioned four dimensions:

**Political dimension:** strengthening of civil society (government and parliament as monitoring, decision-making and control bodies), planning and budgetary control, support and professionalisation of non-governmental organisations and the press.

**Economic and development dimension:** measures to implement disarmament and conversion, demobilisation and reintegration of armed forces, civil utilisation of resources formerly used for military purposes (e.g. immovables).

**Social dimension:** strengthening of public security, including training in the preparation of security-related analyses and the assessment of citizens' security needs. Control of arms transfer, and especially measures to control the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

**Institutional dimension** (not primarily development-oriented and therefore of low priority): professionalisation and reallocation of functions to the armed forces, training of armed

forces in the application of international norms and laws.

Chapter 5 “Recommendations for Development Cooperation” proposes 15 recommended measures.

## 4 Problems and Dilemmas

The security sector is a politically sensitive area. Reform programmes encounter serious problems which, although they also generally play a role in Technical Cooperation, are extremely relevant here due to the sensitive nature of the security sector, and therefore require very close attention: (1) the issue of the right partners for reform in the concerned countries, (2) the coherence of donor countries' own policies, and (3) selection of development-policy priorities in the face of scarce funds.

### 4.1 The Right Partners

It cannot be assumed as a matter of principle that the will to reform the security sector is always present in developing countries, or that those countries are ready to accept external involvement or support in this specific sector. Yet that will is a precondition for sustainable and systematic reforms. This demarcates the possible limits to external support. Attention has also been drawn to the often dubious role played by actors in the security sector. For instance, is cooperation for reform possible with the former military forces responsible for the genocide in Rwanda? Is the bloody history of the military in South America a reason to remain cautious in cooperation today, or to turn it down? Can development cooperation in the judicial sector work with the Taliban in Afghanistan, and must cooperation be modified or discontinued in view of the coup in

Pakistan, or the nuclear ambitions in India? What are the implications of the Indonesian military's action in East Timor for security-sector reform? Key questions need to be asked for all developing countries, the answers to which will only rarely be clear and unequivocal.

If the assessment by development experts quoted above is correct, namely that guaranteed human security is crucially dependent on the role played by actors in the security sector, then it is necessary to implement the needed reforms together with appropriate partners. In many cases this partnership will be more complicated than in some other areas of development cooperation. Occasionally it will be necessary to decline cooperation, for instance with a corrupt judicial apparatus, or to turn down training programmes for the armed forces where there is a risk that direct military assistance may promote or legitimate activities that do not lead to an increase in human security, but the opposite. There will be situations in which the borderline between involvement in reform measures considered to be positive, and a possible (unintentional) complicity in programmes of questionable development-policy value, will not always be clearly evident in advance.

In cases of doubt, it is therefore appropriate to avoid direct cooperation with security forces, and instead to strengthen and support primarily those elements responsible for democratic

control of the security sector. In the long term, support for civilian governments, democratically elected parliaments, civil servants with competences for control, and monitors within civil society will advance security-sector reform more sustainably than military or police assistance that is of a questionable nature. Consequently, emphasising the promotion of good governance (also in the security sector) is often the most constructive, albeit indirect way to achieve the objectives of human security and sustainable development.

*Intelligence Services*

“The role of intelligence services in the security sector should be recognised and addressed. Practically all governments find it necessary to maintain specialized forces in this area... Intelligence agencies should be included in security sector reform where their work is concerned with internal security threats. In this area, donors have been reluctant to contribute, as the need for transparency that pervades all other efforts in security sector reform is difficult to reconcile with the development of secret services. To counteract the obvious lack of transparency, the intelligence agencies must be subject to some form of civilian control. A complete detachment of such services from a general process of reform may easily undermine constructive development in other areas.”

Source: NUPI 1999, p. 19.

## **4.2 Donor Policy Coherence**

In the past, international cooperation in the security sector and Technical Cooperation were not only not mutually harmonised, but in many cases were diametrically opposed. The

truth of this statement could be demonstrated with examples from almost every donor country. Whilst ministries for development would try to push through a reduction in military expenditure commensurate with development needs, ministries of economic affairs would lobby for the arms industry. Whilst development experts were developing strategies for appropriate technology transfer, the transfer of high-tech weapons systems was flourishing. Whilst negotiations were under way on debt cancellation programmes, arms imports were again increasing foreign indebtedness. Whilst human rights violations were being condemned at international conferences, trainers were transferring methods of torture. These contradictions went so far that it was not uncommon for armed forces on UN international peacekeeping missions to be attacked with weapons systems which had previously been supplied to the “violators” of international norms. Recent examples range from Iraq to Yugoslavia, from Angola to Sierra Leone, from Tajikistan to Indonesia. This trend towards the unquestioning supply of weapons was reinforced *inter alia* by a liberal policy on the export of arms which had become superfluous as a result of disarmament.

Whilst there is a more acute understanding today of the need for a coherent policy among the donor countries and international organisations, the implementation of such a policy in the security sector leaves something to be desired. Short-term interests, often motivated by micro-economic concerns, continue to conflict

with objectives of sustainable human development. The central prerequisite for an effective and systematic reform of the security sector is coordinated and mutually harmonised foreign, security, economic and development policies. There is major potential for complementarity, although there is an equal risk of declared goals acting as mutual constraints or insurmountable obstacles.

Not only must donor country measures not conflict with each other, they must also be harmoniously balanced. It may for instance be appropriate to equip the police force of a country with modern firearms, but only subject to the proviso that they behave in compliance with the rule of law, and only if and when corresponding civil controls guarantee that they do so.

*Policy Coherence*

“There is considerable potential for complementarity between DFID support and existing MOD (Ministry of Defence) and FCO (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) activities in the area of security sector reform:

The FCO’s Assistance to Support Stability with In-Service Training (ASSIST) is designed to promote, within overseas military and police forces, respect for civilian democratic government and practices, the rule of law and international human rights standards. ... The MOD’s new Defence Diplomacy Mission, announced by the MOD as part of the Strategic Defence Review, aims to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust and assist in the development of democratically accountable armed forces, including internal security forces...”

Source: DFID 1999, p. 7.

### 4.3 Selecting Priorities in the Light of Scarce Funds

A number of other conflicting objectives might come to present a dilemma in security-sector reform, or act as constraints. Measures to increase public security can require the use of a large volume of resources – resources which are then no longer available for other programmes. Given the scarcity of Technical Cooperation funds, it will often be necessary to set priorities. Consequently, involvement in security-sector reform will urgently require a strict application of development-policy criteria. The “do no harm” positions (Mary Anderson) familiar from the development debate will also be especially relevant as benchmarks for involvement by Technical Cooperation in security-sector reform.

Other possible conflicting objectives need only be mentioned peripherally. Additional civil control can, under certain circumstances, mean a loss of professionalism. Furthermore, we should remind ourselves of the risk that a broader interpretation of the term security might be misunderstood as meaning a possible broadening of the function of the military (entailing a militarisation of society).

Reform programmes must take into account and carefully weigh such dilemmas and conflicting objectives.

## 5 Recommendations for Development Cooperation

### 5.1 The Concept of Reform

**Recommendation 1:** Security-sector reform aims to achieve increased security, civil control of the security forces, an appropriate consumption of resources and a professionalisation of actors in the security sector. Primarily, these objectives are not achieved through direct intervention in the security sector. Indirect measures should rather be considered. Concretely, the perspective should not be confined exclusively to the security forces.

**Recommendation 2:** It is necessary to determine precisely which measures are appropriate for promoting security-sector reform. It is also necessary to select a comprehensive approach which encompasses the armed forces, the police, the executive and legislature, the judicial and penal systems, and civil society. (Whether or not the intelligence services should also actually be reformed with support from external actors is questionable).

For Technical Cooperation it is especially important that, in view of the low level of practical project experiences available, prospective feasibility studies and flanking evaluations be conducted.

**Recommendation 3:** A key prerequisite for an effective and systematic strategy to support security-sector reform is policy coherence. Foreign, security, economic and development policy must be mutually harmonised, and must not conflict. This process of coordination must

embrace in particular programmes of military and police assistance, and arms export policy. Technical Cooperation can only operate successfully if these policy frameworks are in place.

**Recommendation 4:** Due to the sensitive nature of security-related issues, there is a need for clear political directives, and consensus on the objectives and the individual activities of the reform programme. The scope and contours of the programme must be precisely defined. The development-policy objectives must be clearly defined. During the last two years the international debate, and coordination among various donor organisations, has made progress. Having said that it would not yet be warranted to speak of a coordinated strategy.

### 5.2 Institutionalising Reform

**Recommendation 5:** The challenge consists in moving forward from the analysis, to the implementation of reform programmes. Having said that, the present paper does not advocate Technical Cooperation projects across the board. In view of the low level of experiences to date, it is recommended that activities be commenced in a small number of particularly promising countries and situations (post-conflict societies). It is recommended that partners in cooperation be found in only two

or three countries. On the basis of existing traditionally good relations, countries such as South Africa and Mali would be obvious candidates (although the reform process is already under way there). Fresh opportunities might also present themselves in Indonesia and Nigeria – following the changes of government there.

**Recommendation 6:** Guaranteeing the long-term success of security-sector reform will require a good deal of stamina. Short-term programmes can be helpful in promoting the emerging peace process in an immediate post-conflict situation (for instance through the disarming of demobilised soldiers and the repatriation of war refugees). Long-term programmes are prerequisite to institutional reforms.

For Technical Cooperation, this means that the needed resources (budgetary funds and expert personnel) must be available.

**Recommendation 7:** In post-conflict societies in particular it is necessary to shift programme priorities away from physical infrastructure reconstruction (roads, ports, water and power utilities, lines of communication etc.), and towards the rehabilitation and reform of institutions (human capital).

**Recommendation 8:** The most effective long-term reform programme is the institutionalisation of an open, democratic security culture. Consequently, security-sector reform must not be confined to professionalisation of

the armed forces and the police, but must also include civil society.

### **5.3 Strengthening and Professionalising Civil Controls and Civil Society**

**Recommendation 9:** Security-sector reform can be most successful where legitimate civil institutions possess the capacity and the expertise to control the security forces. The provision of support and training to government agencies, parliament, the civil service, non-governmental organisations and the press etc. must be a part of effective reform (strengthening of the legislative and executive capacities, and of civil society in general).

Existing experiences of Technical Cooperation (democratisation programmes, training programmes) should be utilised for security-sector reform. Technical Cooperation should focus on supporting local capacity-building for the conduct of security analyses (threat analysis) and improved budget management.

**Recommendation 10:** To strengthen the local ownership of reform projects, it is strongly recommended that research capacities be established in the reforming countries. The DAC/OECD analysis draws express attention to the need to support South-South cooperation in this sector (DAC/OECD 2000, p. 26).

## 5.4 Cooperating with the Right Partners

**Recommendation 11:** It is desirable that the security forces accept the need for reform, and are willing to play an active role in it. In some conflict formations, institutions of the security sector have come out clearly in favour of reforms, although political leaders have not necessarily always done likewise. Politicians occasionally attempt to instrumentalise actors of the security sector in pursuit of their political interests. It is recommended that direct cooperation with the immediate actors of the security sector be avoided where those actors are unwilling to reform.

Technical Cooperation can only be successful here if it is able to draw on the appropriate expertise (experts of the military, police, judiciary). The experiences of the past, which urge us to remain cautious, should be remembered.

**Recommendation 12:** In case of doubt it is recommended that cooperation for reform take place primarily with civil society, instead of embarking on questionable programmes with the immediate actors of the security sector, the consequences of which cannot be foreseen.

## 5.5 Professionalising the Security Forces

**Recommendation 13:** Military and police assistance programmes must not be of the traditional variety (as during the Cold War). They should not be designed primarily to pro-

vide expensive, modern equipment, or even to serve exclusively as an opening for arms export interests. These programmes must include training in the protection of human rights and respect for international norms. In the past, military and police aid have often have the opposite effect. Programmes should also include components of confidence-building measures with neighbouring countries, preparation for UN international peacekeeping missions, and crisis prevention. For implementation of these programmes, other institutions (the military, the police) will presumably be more appropriate than the traditional actors of Technical Cooperation.

## 5.6 Overcoming the Legacy of War and Conflict

**Recommendation 14:** Violent conflicts within a society and wars with neighbouring countries usually lead to militarisation and armament. Demilitarisation is necessary in order to create viable, development-oriented structures. Programmes of security-sector reform and disarmament can be mutually complementary. The demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants can for instance be utilised in the appropriate reduction and restructuring of the armed forces, and in enlargement of the police force. Such programmes also include demining projects, the scrapping of surplus weapons systems, the establishment of effective control bodies (customs, police) to control the arms trade (especially trade in small arms and light weapons). Social integration programmes and

psychological support to help work through traumatic experiences (especially those of child soldiers) should be incorporated into reforms.

**Recommendation 15:** To guarantee the success of security-sector reform it is recommended that proven programmes of Technical Cooperation be networked with demilitarisation projects (for instance making proven training measures available to demobilised soldiers, converting military infrastructure to civilian purposes wherever possible). Technical Cooperation can bundle proven disarmament and conversion projects under the heading “security-sector reform”, and supplement them with further projects (especially involving civil society capacity building). Unconventional projects should also be considered, for instance linking debt relief and weapons repurchasing programmes (World Bank 1999, p. 1 - 3).

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- Defense industry restructuring – Facing a changed environment
- Demobilization and reintegration – Opportunities for human development
- Base closure and redevelopment – A challenge for communities
- Surplus weapons – Dismantling the remnants of conflicts

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