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Violence and Security Concerns in Post-Conflict Situations

Sabine Kurtenbach / Herbert Wulf

Project Working Paper No. 3

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„Instruments and Procedures of German Development Cooperation in Post-Conflict Situations“

Notes on the Authors:

Sabine Kurtenbach, Dr. phil., is political scientist with a specialization in conflict and peace processes. She is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Latin American Studies at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) in Hamburg, and Associate Fellow at the Institute for Development and Peace (INEF), University of Duisburg-Essen. From 2006 to 2008 she was a senior researcher at INEF in a project on youth violence in Guatemala and Cambodia. She has worked as a consultant for different German organizations of development cooperation.

Contact: kurtenbach@giga-hamburg.de

Herbert Wulf, Prof., is consultant und Adjunct Senior Advisor at the INEF. From 2002-2004 he was Senior Fellow und Project Supervisor at the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), which he headed from 1994-2001. His areas of research include: UN Peacekeeping, Civil-Military Relations, Security Sector Reform, Private Security Companies. He worked for the DED in India and is currently working as a consultant for national and international organizations.

Contact: wulf.herbert@web.de

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Lotharstraße 53 D - 47057 Duisburg
Phone +49 (203) 379 4420 Fax +49 (203) 379 4425
E-Mail: inef-sek@inef.uni-due.de
Homepage: http://inef.uni-due.de

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Violence and Security Concerns in Post-Conflict Situations

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This paper will analyze the problems and challenges for the present engagement of development cooperation in security and conflict environments, with a special but not exclusive emphasis on so-called post-conflict and post-war situations. Our main goal is to enhance analytical understanding and the related challenges for external actors as this is the basis for the development of adequate and viable instruments to deal with the related problems. In the first of the three main parts of the paper we will look at the key concepts and definitions related to contexts labelled 'post-conflict' – and their problematic usage. In section two we will discuss the characteristics and dynamics on the ground in the social space of post-war and post-conflict societies as the basis for some reflections on violence control and reduction in these contexts. Section three will change the perspective to the interventions of development cooperation and the analysis of various aspects of security concerns: security sector reform as a development concept, privatization of violence and its effects on the monopoly of force, and, finally, the security of aid workers in post-conflict countries and situations shaped by large-scale violence and insecurity. The final section puts forward some recommendations for development cooperation operating in these contexts.

Contents

List of Abbreviations

AKUF	Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung
ANSO	Afghanistan NGO Safety Office
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
AVR	Armed Violence Report
BMZ	Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CIM	Centrum für Internationale Migration und Entwicklung
CSCE	Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe
DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee
DCAF	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces
DDR	Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration
DED	Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst
DFID	Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EISF	European Interagency Security Forum
EU	European Union
GANSO	Gaza Strip NGO Safety Office Project
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH
HSR	Human Security Report
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGO	International Governmental Organization
InWent	Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung gGmbH
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Programme
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
US DOD	United States Department of Defense

WDR	World Development Report
WHO	World Health Organization
WSP	War-Torn Societies Project

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Introduction – Organized Violence and Trends in the Security-Development Nexus

During the last two decades, development cooperation has been confronted with several broad trends of challenges and change in the international global order, related to the security situation and having a strong impact on its work. But patterns of violence, armed conflict and war have changed during the last decades, making clear-cut distinctions difficult. While violence is a common feature, its intensity, forms of organization and motives vary. International statistics on armed conflict and war show a significant decline in the number of wars during the last 15 years (e.g. HSR 2009/2010). These contexts are commonly labelled as 'post-conflict' – meaning that organized armed violence has either decreased significantly or has been formally terminated. This has become an important field of action for development cooperation, reflected in increasing levels of aid channelled through the United Nations and other donors for peace-building.[1] But even in these contexts, violence and insecurity may be as endemic as in contexts of open armed conflict and more generally in fragile situations. International development cooperation confronts a set of contexts, sharing patterns of generalized violence and insecurity but differing by the way violence is framed and conceptualized. In his 2009 report on peace-building in the immediate aftermath of conflict, the UN Secretary-General (A/63/881 S/2009/304, 6-7) emphasized that: "Basic security and safety — whether provided by the State or with international assistance — are essential to the population and to create the needed political space, and to enable the delivery of international assistance."

A growing number of reports and analyses have addressed the related problems, the most recent being the World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development.

While most of these investigations focus on specific problems related to the overall topic of security and development, they all struggle with a common set of problems and challenges:

1. Violence is a Janus-faced phenomenon with complex causation mechanisms and dynamics, various actors and goals. Compared with conflicts defined as war, the last decades have seen a shift towards less organized, less political and more localized forms of violence (see section 1.). As neither traditional

[1] Data are difficult to trace as OECD/DAC (2010) figures for official development assistance (ODA) group fragile and conflict states together. From the countries listed, 13 fall into the category of post-war or post-conflict countries listed in Table 2 below. Those countries received a third of ODA in 2008, Ethiopia leading the list with a share of 11%, followed by Pakistan, Uganda and Rwanda. In the case of Pakistan, the high levels of ODA are less related to its post-conflict status than to the international interest in stabilizing a country close to a regional conflict focus.

peacekeeping nor 'one size fits all' approaches seem to work, external actors need to adapt their interventions to these complex changes.[2]

2. The high human and material costs of violence, coupled with an increasing number of refugees, led to the promotion of humanitarian aspects, including requests for 'humanitarian interventions'. Where conflict and insecurity prevail due to a lack of local capacities of the state, the international community has a 'responsibility to protect' and is called upon to intervene in the form of conflict management, mediation, emergency relief, development aid, peace-building, state-building etc. or – as a last resort – military intervention.
3. The global context for these approaches is shaped by the inter-linkage between the quest for democracy and for security, encapsulated in state-building efforts. Policy approaches are based on global governance and the 'liberal peace paradigm', emphasizing such international norms as democracy, human rights, human security and development (Luckham 2003, 3-4).[3]
4. At the same time empirical evidence is growing that international donors' policies of transformation and democratization may or may not lead to more security and development in the long run (Luckham 2009) but breed fragility at different levels in the short run.[4]

These trends and the tremendous challenges of conflicts and violence resulted in an intensive debate among development practitioners about the nexus of development and security. 'No development without security, no security without development' – the new dictum in development cooperation – led to the introduction of concepts of 'conflict sensitivity' and to implementing programmes directly linked to conflict mitigation and prevention and security enhancement – most pronouncedly so in security sector reform (SSR), demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants and mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity. But the spectrum of donors' activities in these complex contexts has significantly increased. In a recent study, Ball and Hendrickson (2009, p. 13) conclude: "By the end of the 1990s, governance was a legitimate subject of discourse for the development donors, and that opened the door for discussions of security-sector governance and collaboration with security actors. What is more, participatory poverty assessments undertaken

[2] See, inter alia, the Human Security Reports 2005 and 2009/2010 and the Global Burden of Armed Violence Report – Geneva Declaration (2008). This has led to a broader debate on Armed Violence Reduction (see OECD/DAC 2009).

[3] Taking the developments in Western Europe and Japan after World War II as a starting point, the liberal peace-building paradigm assumes that democratization and market economies are the foundations for pacification and security. See Paris (2004), for a critique Richmond 2006, Kurtenbach 2010.

[4] There is sound statistical evidence that the process of democratization is rather prone to conflict (Hegre 2004). In post-conflict countries, both security governance and democratization remain contested issues and elections tend to polarize, thus creating new tensions. Elections typically produce winners and losers and the losers cannot be reconciled (Collier 2009). Walter (2010) shows that governance deficits are a main cause of armed conflict recurrence.

since the 1990s consistently identified the lack of security as a major concern for poor people, especially a) crime and violence, b) civil conflict and war, c) prosecution by the police, and d) lack of justice."[5]

Most of all, the UN took on a more active role in preventing, mitigating or ending conflict, adapting its strategies to the new contexts, mostly by expanding the spectrum of its interventions from traditional peacekeeping to peace-building. Traditionally, the UN was reluctant to deploy troops with a mandate authorizing the use of force. This has changed now. From its beginning in 1945 until the end of 1989, the UN had engaged in a total of 18 peace operations in over four decades; during the following two decades this figure increased to 44 peacekeeping operations, most of them with a robust military force. In 2010, the UN deployed over 123,000 peacekeepers, almost 86,000 of them troops and military observers, 14,000 police and 23,000 civilians.[6]

Figure 1: UN Peacekeepers: Uniformed Personnel, 1995 – 2010



Uniformed personnel: troops, police, military observers, as of January each year

Source: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/

The number of military interventions increased significantly as did the number of deployed peacekeepers. These UN activities have enormous consequences for development aid. Programmes in countries or regions such as DRC, Darfur, Haiti, East Timor and others illustrate the close linkage, but also the complicated cooperation between strongly security-oriented programmes, partly with thousands of peacekeeping troops deployed, and development programmes that are geared to

[5] However, while 'soft' security issues (human security, security governance) became attractive to the donor community, the 'war on terror' raised the spectre of a renewed focus on traditional 'hard' security doctrines reminiscent of the Cold War era.
[6] UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/bnote.htm.

stabilizing a fragile peace process.

The UN system has been increasingly overburdened by its peacekeeping agenda. A systematic review of the peacekeeping operations (UN General Assembly 2001) and the newly discovered 'new regionalism' (Hettne 2008) propose an intensified reliance on regional and sub-regional organizations to engage in peacekeeping and peace-building. The UN and regional arrangements are progressively more engaged in sharing responsibility for peacekeeping, especially in situations of state fragility and violence by non-state actors. Donor countries and multilateral institutions have aided regional organizations in capacity-building, especially in Africa, to enable them to function as peacekeepers and peace-builders. The motivation for the engagement of regional organizations in conflict prevention and resolution might seem compelling; however, the results are mixed.

Regional organizations are supposed to have an immediate interest in promoting peace since inter-state and intra-state wars as well as other forms of violent conflicts normally affect the region through spill-over and destabilization. Experience shows that this logic is not always applied. Regional organizations disagree and often quarrel about the best approach to prevent violent conflict (Wulf and Debiel 2010). Nathan (2010, 10) concludes in a summary of an elaborate study of many regional organizations: "Indeed, the most striking aspect of this picture is the variation in effectiveness. The organizations range from being highly successful (i.e. the EU) to being completely ineffectual (i.e. SAARC) or largely ineffectual (i.e. SADC and IGAD). Within this spectrum there are organizations that have been effective in certain respects but not others (i.e. ASEAN) and institutions whose effectiveness has changed in different historical periods (i.e. the CSCE/OSCE)."[7]

Peace-building efforts are usually complex and fragile. The peace process often requires a determined effort by local, national and international actors, especially in the face of ongoing violence and opposition from spoilers. International support through development aid is fundamentally political and therefore often involves high risks since usually empowerment of some political forces is at the expense of others, easily leading to new conflicts.

This paper will analyze the problems and challenges for the present engagement of development cooperation in security and conflict environments, with a special but not exclusive emphasis on so-called post-conflict and post-war situations. Our main goal is to enhance analytical understanding and the related challenges for external actors as this is the basis for the development of adequate and viable instruments to deal with the related problems. Hence, we do not aim to assess existing toolkits or develop new ones because they have to be based on and adapted to the specific contexts through profound analysis. In the first of the three main parts of the paper (section 1.) we will look at the key terms and definitions related to contexts labelled 'post-conflict' – and their problematic usage. This section presents the relevant concepts

[7] For detailed case studies on the different regional organizations used by Nathan, see the webpage of the Crisis State Research Centre, LSE. http://www.crisisstates.com/Publications/phase2papers.htm.

and definitions of violence and its varied forms of organization as a necessary condition for the approximation to post-war or post-conflict contexts. Our conclusion is – given the continuation of armed violence in many countries after the end of intra- or inter-state war – that the term 'post-conflict', while widely used, is actually a misnomer. In addition, we will discuss the varied usage of the term 'security' (the broader and the narrower concepts) and its manifold connection to development.

We will then address in section 2. the dynamics on the ground in the social space of post-war and post-conflict societies and will analyse the characteristics of post-conflict and situations of armed violence, the different forms of wars, the ending of conflict and their effects on violence and violent actors in post-conflict settings. As this paper aims to provide a conceptual basis for understanding the main characteristics and dynamics shaping the often chaotic developments on the ground, systematizing the different forms and expressions of violence is necessary. This is the basis for some thoughts on violence control and reduction in these contexts. In addition, we develop a rough typology of post-war and post-conflict social spaces shaped by changing and prevailing dynamics and power relations.

Section 3. will change the perspective to the interventions of development cooperation and the analysis of various aspects of security concerns: security sector reform as a development concept, privatization of violence and its effects on the monopoly of force, and, finally, the security of aid workers. This section has a broader focus. It is not restricted to an analysis of security concerns in post-conflict but often – when appropriate – will draw on experiences of other than post-conflict countries. These are countries that are still entangled in large-scale violence or countries that have never experienced wars but are still challenged in their development by insecurity. This approach is due to our observation that insecurity is a typical characteristic of war-torn societies, fragile states and many post-conflict societies.[8] Violent conflict can be perceived as a continuum rather than a bi-polar 'in conflict' versus 'post-conflict' phenomenon.

The final section (4.) summarizes the results and puts forward some recommendations for development cooperation operating in these contexts.

[8] The OECD defines states as fragile "when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations" (OECD 2007b). In a more recent publication the lack of legitimacy was added to this definition (OECD 2010). Although the OECD definition of state fragility is widely accepted now by the donor community, it does not clearly distinguish between situations of 'fragility' and 'underdevelopment'. All poor countries, including many post-conflict countries, suffer from the lack of capacity to reduce poverty, but not all are necessarily fragile. Some poor countries are in fact very resilient. They consolidate but do not necessarily become developmental and transform (Putzel 2010). Of course, there are specific forms of post-conflict fragility, but fragility does not necessarily mean that violence looms large.

1. Concepts and Definitions

1.1. What is 'post-conflict'?

The term 'post-conflict' or 'post-conflict situations' is usually used when a war or violent conflict has ended – be that in the form of an armistice, a peace treaty, military victory, a negotiated settlement or an external intervention. However, there is no accepted definition of what constitutes a situation, country or society of 'post-conflict'. Talking to practitioners about the specific challenges of working in countries where a war or armed conflict ended, most of them emphasize the difficulties in differentiating between these countries and those in conflict (Leonhard/Wulf 2010). Even in cases with certain patterns of stabilization, armed conflict or war can still go on in some geographical regions. Practical experience of aid workers as well as systematic empirical evidence show that very often, violence does not end with an armistice or a treaty and the structural causes of conflict often live on despite peace settlements. Violence and insecurity in post-conflict environments prove to be adaptive and often very resilient. Thus post-war or post-conflict situations are characterized as "neither war nor peace" (Richards 2005) or "no peace, no war" (Mac Ginty 2008) contexts where the use of violence might have been reduced but is nevertheless an option or a strategy for some actors.

Among other challenges in these contexts, such as conflicting priorities or a lack of integrated approaches (Kurtenbach 2009), development cooperation faces the problem of how to cope with dynamic and high levels of insecurity that cannot be reduced to the problem of backslide into war or armed conflict. Hence, the widespread term of 'post-war' or 'post-conflict' contexts used currently in academic and policy debates is a misnomer.[9] A necessary first step for the development of adequate strategies to cope with these situations is awareness of their complexity and the patterns that shape violence and insecurity in post-conflict and post-war situations.

Nevertheless, the common assumption is that in situations classified as 'post-conflict', a dramatic change has taken place and attractive windows of opportunity for development cooperation facilitating the development process are being opened. However, the record of post-conflict recovery is somewhat mixed, ranging from rather poor performances with relapses into violent conflict and the failure to recover

[9] In relation to the consequences of war and armed conflict, the term 'war-torn societies' used by the UN Research Institute (UNRISD) in the mid-1990s is much more appropriate. Between 1994 and 1998, UNRISD organized a research project called the War-torn Societies Project (WSP) focusing on the main problems of developing societies in their transition out of war. Based on an action/ participation-oriented methodology, the project was aimed not only at analysis but also the development of concrete proposals and strategies for internal as well as external actors. Case studies were elaborated on Eritrea, Mozambique, Guatemala and Somalia. On Guatemala, see Torres-Rivas/Arévalo de León 1999. On the current debates, see inter alia Heathershaw/Lambach 2008 and the special issue of the Journal of Peace Research 2008 no.4, vol. 45; on the challenges for development cooperation Kurtenbach 2009 and Kurtenbach/Seiffert 2010.

to remarkable peace processes which have led societies out of the conflict trap,[10] enabling sustainable development to take place. Hence, the term 'post-conflict', taken verbatim, is often a misnomer, since violent conflict continues to play an important role even after conflict settlements have occurred. Despite the shortcomings of this term, we will continue to refer to 'post-conflict' in this paper since the term is so overwhelmingly applied, especially in the donor community.

What we mean when we talk about post-war and post-conflict contexts depends to a high degree on our understanding of war and armed conflict. These terms are far from being defined on the basis of a shared understanding of the factors involved. For example, the term 'trade wars' does not imply the use of any violence. As a consequence, it is necessary to understand how our framing of violence shapes our understanding of violence in and after contexts categorized as war or armed conflict.

1.2. The Manifold Forms of Violence

Violence can appear in very different forms. A brief look at the newspapers shows a variety of meanings violence can have. Most people will agree that acts where one person or group harms or kills another one is an act of violence, regardless of whether this happens in the daily confrontations in Iraq or Afghanistan, in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro or in the private realm of the family between parents, children or spouses. Defining violence that is less direct is much more difficult as this does not necessarily include direct physical harm or material damage like so-called structural or cultural violence (see Galtung 1971, 1990, Heitmeyer/Soeffner 2004, Gugel 2006). In the following, the term violence will be used only for direct physical violence as defined by the World Health Organization (2002:5): "The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation."

Even under such a limited perspective, violence shows very different and manifold forms and expressions. Distinctions can be made according to criteria related to organization, relationship, space and goals, based on

1. the level of organization of the perpetrators: individual versus collective violence;
2. the relationship between victim and perpetrator: intimate versus anonymous violence;
3. the space where violence happens: domestic/private versus public or urban versus rural violence;
4. the goals violence is used for: economic, social, political violence.[11]

[10] Collier et al (2003) have coined this term for countries with recurrent cycles of violent conflict. While the specific data and patterns of conflict recurrence are part of a debate (Suhrke/Samset 2007), there is evidence that post-conflict countries pose a higher risk than other countries.

[11] The WHO (2002:7) uses a slightly different typology distinguishing between self-directed, interpersonal (family/partner, community) and collective (social, political, economic) forms of violence.

Depending on the academic or policy focus, different forms of direct violence are analyzed and dealt with. The individual predisposition towards the use of violence has been researched primarily in social psychology while international politics traditionally focused on international wars between sovereign states. Inter-state war is a specific form of collective, anonymous, public and political violence. But even for international actors, violence has changed during the last decades due to the prevalence of internal wars and armed conflicts where economic and social motivations and a certain privatization of violence can be observed. These changing patterns of violence and warfare have lead to the discussion and investigation of so-called new wars, warlords and privatized armed actors (see, for example, Kaldor 2001, Münkler 2002, Eppler 2002, Kurtenbach/Lock 2004, Wulf 2005). This discussion has drawn heavily on concepts and theories of political sociology and anthropology for understanding the related dynamics and everyday experiences of violence (e.g. Elwert 2004, Scheper-Hughes/Bourgois 2004, Kalyvas 2006). [12]

While there is general agreement that violence is a complex and multifaceted problem, framing violence as war, armed conflict or criminal behaviour has consequences for the approaches introduced to reduce, control and sanction violent behaviour. For international politics and cooperation, the classification of violence as war or armed conflict may allow mediation, while combating crime is a question for the (international and national) judiciary.

So what are the central characteristics of violence that is defined as war? In social science research on war, two different definitions have been widely used over the last few decades. The quantitative approach establishes a certain number of casualties per year in combat. The best known of these approaches is that of the Correlates of War project – the mother of war statistics. It defines war as a serious armed conflict between at least two actors (one of which must be a recognized state) that leads to more than 1,000 violent deaths a year. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) is based on the same definition but introduces the term 'minor armed conflict' for those forms of violence causing between 25 and 999 directly related battleground deaths. Competing approaches use qualitative criteria like the Hamburg-based Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung (AKUF), defines war as an armed mass conflict with a minimum degree of central organization and continuity between two or more actors and the participation of a state or para-state force on at least one side (see Gantzel/Schwinghammer 1995: 31ff).[13]

Independently of other differences, all definitions attach importance to the fact that one party to the war has to represent or be closely related to a state, which reflects the reality of war during most decades of the 20th century. But in the wake of growing

[12] Recent practitioners' reports and publications like the OECD/DAC Armed Violence Reduction Report (2009), the recent yearbooks of the Small Arms Survey (Graduate Institute 2011), the Geneva Declaration Report (2008) and the most recent World Development Report (2011) have started a discussion on the implications of these changing patterns for international cooperation. For a short assessment see below.

[13] Chojnacki 2008 and Schreiber 2010 discuss the implications of definitions and the related differences between these databases.

globalization and transnationalization in the 21st century, the state has not only lost its dominant position in the world economy but has also forfeited its pre-eminence as an actor in collective violence. Thus the criterion of state involvement has become the subject of critique as different forms of privatized violence – from warlords to military companies – are involved. The identification of a war's beginning and end has never been a simple task but it was much easier when the actors involved were sovereign states, state forces or insurgent groups. Comparing datasets based on different definitions, distinctions in the 'worlds of violence' become obvious (Eberwein/Chojnacki 2001), although the most obvious are differences in war's beginning or end as these are recorded according to the changing intensity of violence used. Thus one dataset records different periods of armed conflict and war while others code this as a single 'event' or 'episodes'.

Closely related to the changing role of the state in collective violence is the discussion of the goals violent actors pursue. In relation to violent conflict labelled as 'war', the classical definition by Clausewitz of "war as a continuation of politics by other means" prevails, while the discussion of 'new wars', warlords and privatized actors focuses on economic motives and greed as a main goal. Thus there is a blurred line between war and crime. But the definition of violent crime is even more complicated as crime is a highly context-specific issue although international law provides some universal categories. But different forms of collective violence cannot be categorized according to their goals as crime does not necessarily imply the use of violence (see Naylor 2009, Andreas/Wallmann 2009 and Snyder/Duran-Martinez 2009).

While determining what constitutes a war or an armed conflict is difficult, the discussion on what constitutes peace is even more complicated. Currently, the debate is dominated by the hypothesis of (internal and international) democratic peace, which assumes that democratic regimes are more peaceful in their bilateral behaviour as well as internally because the use of violence is limited by the rule of law and by existing checks and balances through democratic control. Even if this might be true for the industrialized consolidated democracies of Western Europe and North America[14], most of today's countries after war or armed conflict do not qualify as consolidated democracies but represent at best hybrid regimes which are far from reaching these normative goals.

Obviously, a minimalist definition of post-war or post-conflict contexts depends on the definition of war and conflict. This is reflected in the different datasets on wars and armed conflicts. Using a quantitative criterion of 1,000 directly battle-related deaths per year like the UCDP, post-war begins when the number of casualties drops under this threshold, not necessarily ceasing totally. If violence escalates again over the 1,000 deaths threshold this is coded as a new war. The same procedure applies for armed conflict. More qualitatively oriented definitions code the end of war and conflict differently, e.g. when violence ceases to be a continuous pattern and is used

[14] Among other arguments, critics emphasize that the path to peace has been very violent in these cases.

only sporadically by the warring factions irrespective of the number of casualties (Schreiber 2010). In both cases, coding is quite complicated. Other factors besides the level of violence indicating that a war or armed conflict have or might come to an end are different forms of agreements and external interventions.

The following table shows the main criteria and arguments for distinctions between war, armed conflict and crime.

Table 1: Criteria Used for Framing Violence

	Number of casualties	Level of organization	Relationship	Space	Goals
War	> 1,000 battle-related deaths	high	anonymous	public	political, economic, social
Armed conflict	25 - 999 battle-related deaths	medium to high	anonymous	public	political, economic, social
Crime	not defined	none to high	intimate to anonymous	private and public	economic, social

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As a consequence, the borders between war, armed conflict and different forms of crime have become blurred, lacking clear-cut distinctions. While the intensity of violence (that is the number of casualties) can serve as an indicator, relationships between perpetrators and victims as well as the identification of the goals must be based on qualitative analysis. These problems are not only relevant for statistical coding and the analysis of violence but have implications for the definition of post-war and 'post-conflict' contexts as well as for the development of strategies of intervention by internal and external actors, among them development cooperation. International donors do not have an explicit or shared definition of post-war or 'post-conflict' contexts. Commonly, war and armed conflict are perceived as having a political motivation (grievance) offering possibilities for mediation and dialogue. On the other hand, violence conceptualized as crime (greed) mostly calls for criminal prosecution. Development cooperation can provide help and support in both cases but will do so using different instruments, procedures, sectoral approaches and toolkits.

1.3. The Security Development Nexus

One of the many challenging tasks in countries that have emerged from armed conflict or war remains the security dilemma, because, typically, in post-conflict and post-war situations the state does not have the capacity to ensure its monopoly of force to guarantee the security of its citizens.

The challenges of conflict, violence, war and insecurity in developing countries are not a new phenomenon. What is relatively new is that the development community has identified the provision of basic security as a decisive factor for development. When large-scale violence ends, people's need for security and other basic services continues. Establishing security and the rule of law and building confidence in the peace process are preconditions for effective development. And people usually have

high expectations of a peace dividend – improvement of everyday physical security being the most important. Development cannot take place unless people have security in their daily lives; hence, the provision of security is essential. Security is seen as the foundation for development in post-conflict situations. Similarly, the disaster relief-development continuum underlines this security-development nexus.

Security has traditionally been used in a narrow military or defence sense: defending a nation's or an alliance's territory against external aggression. In the development context, security has a much broader meaning. UNDP, in its influential 1994 Human Development Report (UNDP 1994, Human Security Centre, 2005), introduced the principle of '**human security'**. This concept rests on the notion that the security of people rather than the security of a country or the territory of a state should be the centre of security policy. Human security incorporates broader political, economic and social issues, hence making it attractive to the development community.[15]

But how to implement programmes aimed at achieving these broad goals? In post-conflict contexts, timing and sequencing the priorities properly is a sensitive aspect of peace programmes. Early provision of security is important to avoid the relapse into conflict but delivery of basic services, such as food, water, health etc., is needed to meet people's survival needs. Political priorities, like elections or radical market liberalization, if pushed too early, can endanger the fragile process of stabilizing peace. Self-critically, a recent report by the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon on peace-building in the immediate aftermath of conflict emphasizes: "In the past, national and international actors have arguably moved too quickly in some areas while moving too slowly in others, upsetting the balance between building confidence and exacerbating tensions" (UN General Assembly 2009, 7).

The quest for security has become a cornerstone of development policy. This is also the case in post-conflict situations. As argued above, despite the classification of countries as 'post-conflict', insecurity is often still all too present. The lack of progress in coping with insecurity is often the greatest single threat to a peace process and a barrier to development. The UN Report concludes: "The initial post-conflict period in most countries is characterized by significant insecurity and political uncertainty. We have learned that continued fragility and considerable volatility often accompany evolving peace processes. Stability in one part of a country may coexist alongside continued violence in other parts. Humanitarian crises and continued violations of human rights may continue to unfold beyond the formal cessation of hostilities. The end of conflict does not necessarily mean the arrival of peace: a lack of political consensus and trust often remains and the root causes of the conflict may persist" (UN General Assembly 2009, 4). Unfortunately, quite often the insecurity is not only experienced in the initial post-conflict period but is endemic in many countries. Hence the Armed Violence Report (OECD/DAC 2009: 14, 40-43)

[15] We refrain here from summarizing the debate on 'narrower' (freedom from fear) and 'broader' (freedom from want) concepts of human security that featured prominently in the international discourse a few years ago.

explicitly acknowledges the necessity to address changing patterns of violence in post-conflict situations and identifies post-conflict contexts as a "new landscape of insecurity".

Insecurity and the search for security in development cooperation have many facets and touch on such fundamental issues as the frequent lack of the state's monopoly of force and international peace-building efforts. At present, two intrinsically contradictory concepts – democratically-oriented reform of the security sector, on the one hand, and the privatization of traditionally military and police functions, on the other – are key determinants of the way in which the state's monopoly of legitimate violence is likely to be exercised in future. Both concepts are applied alternatively or sometimes simultaneously in post-conflict countries. But as these concepts are highly context-sensitive, we need to analyse the social space constituting 'post-conflict' environments before going into more detail.

2. The Social Space of Post-war and Post-conflict Societies – an Approximation

Post-war and 'post-conflict' societies display high levels of instability, fragility and inequality (Licklider 2001:697f) and are characterized by different, overlapping and interacting processes and dynamics. Hence they constitute a social space shaped by a variety of actors, dynamics and power relations and not just a change in conflict intensity. Developments on the ground are shaped by social change as well as by the consequences and aftermath of war and violence and external interventions and influences (Kurtenbach 2010). The consequences of violence are not limited to the number of battle-related deaths and the destruction of the social and economic infrastructure but include social relations disrupted and changed during war and armed conflict.

While the reconstruction of the physical infrastructure may be possible in the short term depending on the availability of resources, other consequences of war and widespread violence will last much longer and are more difficult to overcome. Wood (2008) identifies six developments that shape the social fabric even after the end of war and armed conflict: patterns of political mobilization, military socialization, polarization of social identities, militarization of local authorities, changing patterns of gender roles and the fragmentation of local economies. Examples of war's long-lasting consequences are the use of stereotypes and prejudices in bilateral relations or deeply ingrained forms of ethnic, political or social polarization. For instance, during the 2003 national elections in Spain, we saw a revival of civil war identities throughout the country more than 60 years after the end of the war and more than 25 years after the successful democratic transition. German history provides us with similar experiences of long-lasting legacies of war, violence and displacement.

The road from war termination towards a situation qualifying as more than the absence of violence defined as war or armed conflict (not even introducing the much more complicated notion of peace) is long and accompanied by a series of problems, bottlenecks and setbacks. This is true even for the question of violence reduction in

post-war and post-conflict contexts serving as the most important marker between war or armed conflict and 'peace'. While an analytical distinction between situations of war/armed conflict and non-war/non-armed conflict is reasonable (Brock 2004), most experiences on the ground show that the end of war or organized violent conflict is neither a rupture with the violent past nor a completely new beginning. At best, it presents a window of opportunity for change. Where in society these changes occur and how sustainable they are depends most of all on the power alignments produced by war shaping the modes of war/armed conflict termination. Hence distinctions between war, post-war and non-war situations are blurred.

The following sections focus first on the patterns of the termination of armed violence and their consequences and then give an overview of the discussion of causes, dynamics and the framing of violence in the aftermath of armed conflict and war.

2.1. Patterns of Wars' and Armed Conflicts' Termination

Theoretically, there are various possibilities for war or conflict termination that are not mutually exclusive: military victory, external intervention, different forms of peace accords (that is a certain form of compromise between the parties), or the phasing out of violence below the threshold of war or armed conflict. [16] Results from the UCDP dataset on conflict termination (1946–2005) are interesting, although they have to be interpreted with care:

- the majority of intra-state conflicts end without a decisive outcome;
- intra-state conflicts are longer than inter-state conflicts regardless of outcome;
- conflicts ending with a victory are shorter than others.

During the last decades, there has been a significant change in the modes of war and armed conflict termination, closely related to the changing patterns of warfare: the number of military victories is diminishing while the number of settlements is increasing.

The analyses of the UCDP and the AKUF databases (Schreiber 2009, 2010) both identify these changes in spite of different coding. During the Cold War, most intra-state wars ended with a victory, whereas today the dominant pattern is "other outcomes" (Kreutz 2010) or settlements (Schreiber 2009:62). According to AKUF data, between 1975 and 1988, 58.1 % of wars ended with a military victory; this share decreased to 50.9 % between 1989 and 1997 and to 38.9 % in the years 1998 to

[16] The UCDP dataset codes four outcomes: victory, peace agreement, ceasefire agreement and others. Besides this classification there are serious problems in coding the end of war and armed conflict due to a lack of information (and the related time lag) as well as due to the features of many intra-state wars that are "on-and-off affairs where periods of peace are interrupted by episodes of fighting" (Kreutz 2010, 244). As a consequence, the UCDP dataset has a much higher number of "conflict episodes" than other datasets where a war might encompass various conflict episodes. Destradi/Mehler (2010) opt for a qualitative approach to war termination, analyzing perceptions on the ground, which is also problematical beyond statistical use due to a lack of comparability and information.

2006. At the same time the percentage of settlements increased from 38.7 % (1975-1988) to 45.5 % (1989-1997) and 58.3 % (1998-2006).

While the termination of armed violence per se is seen as positive, the question remains whether and how the modes of war and conflict termination influence post-war and post-conflict settings. This is not only relevant for the analysis of recurrence of war or armed conflict but also for the overall patterns shaping the context of post-war and post-conflict societies.

A victory by the government seems to reduce the risk of war or conflict recurrence (Kreutz 2010, 248) and establishes – at least in the short-term – clear-cut power relations. For centuries in Western Europe, internal wars have ended when one side was able to impose its dominance by military victory. Norbert Elias (1976) has called this "elimination contests" between elites and showed how this provided the basis for the establishment of modern national states with the monopoly of force. To a certain extent this pattern can also be found in some of the classic guerrilla wars of the second half of the 20th century although the balance of military power here was influenced by alignment to external powers like the United States or the Soviet Union. This has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. Suhrke (2011, 9) identifies a set of preconditions for and consequences of a victor's peace: the nature of conflict is important as there are conflicts perceived as total and not allowing for compromise, e.g. ideological conflicts seeking to establish (or maintain) a specific social order. In these cases, post-war and post-conflict contexts show relatively high levels of control by the state (or its equivalent). Franco's Spain after the civil war in 1939 is a case in point.

The effects of settlements or agreements are more complex. In the best cases, they are a first step for necessary reforms or institutional change and the promotion of civil conflict resolution and sustainable development. But agreements can also lead to significant blockades when they are used simply to 'freeze' a conflict's causes, either because they are not included in a settlement or because power relations do not allow for significant reforms and changes. On the other hand, it is obvious that – compared to a military victory – agreements lead to contexts with a high level of uncertainty and volatility, depending on the motivations for signing an agreement as well as on provisions and implementation. In a recent statistical study, Walter (2010) shows that governance and political institutions are highly relevant not only for war and armed conflict prevention but also for their recurrence.

Cases where violence just phases out without formal provisions seem to be the least stable and most complex as violence can resume at any time without any party having to break their word or a formal agreement.

While a military victory might provide the most stable environment for development cooperation, at least in the short and middle term, it poses other political risks and problems, as can be studied looking at Sri Lanka. During the last decade, many donors supported and funded peace processes in an attempt to end the war between the government and the Tamil Tigers. After the collapse of the negotiations and the

governments' military victory, some donors started to phase out or redirect the focus of their work.

The following table lists post-war and post-conflict countries where wars ended after 2000 and the modes of termination (without the recurrence of war or armed conflict after 2008).

Table 2: Post-conflict and Post-war Societies After 2000

	Duration	Modes of termination
Africa		
Angola	1975-2002	victory (state)
Burundi	1993-2006	agreement
Ethiopia – Eritrea*	1998-2000	agreement
Guinea	2000-2001	victory (state)
Ivory Coast	2002-2004	agreement
Liberia	2000-2003	agreement
Rwanda	1997-2002	victory (state)
Senegal	1990-2004	agreement
Sierra Leone	1991-2002	agreement
Uganda	1995-2006	agreement
Asia		
Indonesia (Aceh)	1999-2005	agreement
Laos	2003-2005	victory (state)
Nepal	1999-2006	agreement
Uzbekistan	1999-2000	victory (state)
Solomon Islands	1998-2000	agreement
MENA		
Iran (mujahideen)	2000	victory (state)
Lebanon	1990-2000 2006 2007	phasing out agreement victory (state)
Pakistan	2005-2006	victory (state)
* This is the only intra-state war in this period. Source: AKUF database		

Promoting negotiated settlements and monitoring their implementation has become a major task for the United Nations and other external actors. While settlements are negotiated in many wars and conflicts, many of them are either not signed or ratified or fail because some of the parties involved (or those not included) see a better chance to pursue their goals via violent means. On the other hand, agreements vary according to their scope: while some may just map out the provisions of a ceasefire, demobilization and disarmament of combatants, others may also provide a comprehensive agenda for change. There are normative arguments in favour of the comprehensiveness of peace accords, but empirical evidence that this makes peace processes more successful is scant.[17] Most quantitative and qualitative studies

[17] There is little – though increasing – research on the provisions of peace agreements in relation to specific issues. Most of this research is policy-oriented; on statebuilding, see Suhrke/Wimpelmann/ Dawes (2007), on education Dupuy (2008), governance Mezzera/Pavicic/Specker (2009), security sector reform Hutchful (2009), development cooperation Kurtenbach (2009), economic provisions (de Vries/Lange/Specker (2009).

investigating the effects of specific peace agreement provisions or institutional designs show highly ambiguous results.[18]

Table 3: Time Horizon and Scope of Peace Agreements

Scope / Time horizon	narrow →	→ comprehensive
Short	Addressing interests and needs of combatants → broader society	
Coping with the consequences of war and violence	ceasefire, DDR, reconstruction, reconciliation	
Broader process of transformation and social change	political reform, economic development, MDGs	
Long	immediate needs → sustainable human development	

Nevertheless, international actors favour agreements over military victory, mostly from a humanitarian perspective, aiming at the reduction of violence, displacement and gross human rights violations and based on changes of international law like the R2P agenda.[19] Although from a normative perspective this is understandable, empirically it disregards the medium- and long-term consequences of unstable outcomes not only for the post-war and post-conflict societies but for the peace-builders themselves. Focusing on the problems of permanent instability, US military strategist Edward Luttwak as early as 1999 started a debate advocating: "Give war a chance". Joel Migdal (2001:137-150) makes a similar – although less polemical – argument indicating that today, many weak states survive due to international support while under other historical circumstances they would have fallen apart or been annexed. Put in another way, one could argue that the international community helps to produce a problem it seeks to solve via its state- and peace-building approach. But this is definitely not an option for development cooperation or international diplomacy according to and honouring human rights treaties and norms as 'the responsibility to protect'.

As a consequence, most post-war and post-conflict environments are shaped by high levels of uncertainty towards future developments, making sound analysis of context a necessity for external actors supporting change and reform for poverty reduction and sustainable development. From a conceptual point of view, it is important to look

[18] See Hoddie/Hartzell (2003) and Glassmyer/Sambanis (2008) on military integration of ex-combatants; on democratization and elections Cawthra/Luckham (2003) Jarstadt/Sisk (2008) and Höglund et al. (2009).

[19] See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: The Responsibility to Protect (online: http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf). The UN Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change formulated a similar view in 2004 (http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf).

at conflict and war as processes that are neither static nor one-dimensional, but shaped by specific and changing dynamics that influence the interests at stake as well as the outcomes. The formal end of war or armed conflict is just one of the factors shaping post-war and post-conflict spaces. It provides for windows of opportunity as well as for the breakdown of negotiation processes or agreements. Nevertheless, the social space of post-war and post-conflict societies is also shaped by the legacies of armed violence (e.g. the intensity and structure of violence), capacities of state and non-state institutions, relations between combatants and non-combatants (their constituencies as well as beyond), and, last but not least, regional or international influences (UN missions, donors, but also economic cycles). The problem of continuing violence and insecurity in these contexts illustrates the complexity of these environments.

Independent of the modes of termination, most observers perceive the end of an armed conflict or a war as an event that may be a turning point, promising the reduction – if not the termination – of organized armed violence. Thus expectations of internal and of external actors tend to be high. Nevertheless, post-war and post-conflict contexts are not situated in a vacuum but are shaped by the legacies of violence (intensity, duration and structure of violence), the outcome (who wins, who loses) and the modes of war or conflict termination. All three factors interact and shape the specific contexts and influence the level and the forms of violence and insecurity on the ground. Hence violence can serve as an important marker.

Post-war and post-conflict contexts can thus be distinguished according to at least two criteria:

1. The level of war or conflict related violence, such as the number of battle-related deaths but also violence against the civilian population or indirect conflict deaths and the amount of displacement giving us some rough indicators of the consequences and impact of widespread violence on society.
2. The terms of termination – agreement, victory, phasing out, interventions – shaping the outcome of war and armed conflict as well as the specific political design of the post-war and post-conflict contexts.

Internal as well as external actors like development cooperation will face quite different challenges and find diverse windows of opportunities according to the characteristics of these environments. To give just one example: the needs of a high number of internally displaced and traumatized people call for other priorities (resettlement, healing, etc.) than contexts with a small number of ex-combatants seeking demobilization and reintegration.

2.2. Violence in Post-war and Post-conflict Societies

The debate on post-war and post-conflict societies has been dominated by the assumption that providing a minimum of physical security is the main condition for

peace processes and peace-building.[20] Hence the analysis of the causes of violence in these contexts is a necessary basis for the framing of violence as well as for the development of strategies to control and reduce violence by internal and external actors.

The analysis of violence in post-war and post-conflict societies has been dominated by the question of war or armed conflict recurrence, while other aspects only recently gained prominence.

2.2.1. Backslide Into War and Armed Conflict

Two observations feed into the debate on war and armed conflict: on the one hand, many post-war and post-conflict countries do slide back into war or armed conflict although numbers are a matter of debate (see Suhrke/Samset 2007). On the other hand, violence in international politics is still only perceived and treated as a problem when defined as war or armed conflict (see Tilly 2003:18, Kurtenbach 2004). Nevertheless, the debate on war and conflict recurrence has identified various crucial aspects which are important for understanding the development in these contexts: [21]

First, there is the security gap, which emerges in relation to former combatants when there is no guarantee of their physical safety at the moment of handing over their weapons or leaving a territory under their control.[22] If a peace accord does not address the related vulnerability and insecurity, there is a real danger of failure. Power-sharing between conflict parties, monitoring and guarantees from external actors can be important mechanisms in this regard (Mehler 2009). So-called 'spoilers' are a significant group here, including ex-combatants but non-armed actors as well.

Second, there are the activities of so-called spoilers: these are mostly the ones who are the first to lose out when the war ends. They can be ex-combatants who attempt either to prevent the signing of a peace accord or influence its content, or to change some of its provisions in the aftermath in order to better their own bargaining position. As a counter-mechanism, the inclusion of veto players is often suggested: these are actors who can veto the implementation of peace accords and make concessions, e.g. with respect to the prosecution of human rights violations. Hence peace-building practitioners opt for inclusive pacts which help to bring spoilers into an agreement, although not at any price.

Third, the continuity of root causes of war as a source of continued or new violent conflict is under discussion. This is mostly but not exclusively related to ex-

[20] The underlying concept of security is restricted to the absence of physical harm while broader notions of human security are seen as long-term goals at best.

[21] See Hampson 1995, Snyder 1997, Walter/Snyder 1999, Darby/McGinty 2000, Darby 2001, Walter 2002, Stedman/Rothchild/Cousens, 2002, Schneckener 2003, Collier et al. 2003. This topic is also at the core of the discussion on stabilization of post-war countries, in which state-building focuses on the restructuring of the security sector (military and police). See also Geneva Graduate Institute 2007, 2010.

[22] On this aspect, see section 3. of this paper for a more detailed discussion.

combatants. Examples abound where structural conflict causes are related to engrained inequality or marginalization that cannot be overcome instantly, such as social inequality or discrimination based on ethnicity.

Despite the depth of this research field, the perspective of recurrence of war and hence on 'political' violence has been too narrow for the discussion of post-war violence because the concentration on the armed actors' behaviour leaves out other actors who might not have been directly involved in the armed conflict but pursue their own interests by resorting to violence, e.g. organized crime. At the same time, ongoing violence beyond the relapse into war has repercussions on the possibilities of non-violent actors, e.g. civil society organizations, as even selected acts of violence may reproduce a climate of fear and terror, reducing non-violent options for change (Kurtenbach 2009a).

2.2.2. Violence Beyond Recurrence

It is only recently that the discussion on post-war violence has opened up a broader perspective.[23] Darby (2006:4ff) identified two sources of violence beyond spoilers: violence exerted by state actors, who can be as divided as their adversaries, and violence 'on the ground', which consists of unorganized conflicts, riots or increasing criminality of paramilitary actors who transform into criminal networks. Organized violence takes place in a growing grey zone of violence that we have difficulty in assigning to one of these situations. At the same time, borders between the actors involved are often blurred as there is a lot of contact and interaction across borders (e.g. for economic reasons) and also because violence can be used in non-war situations to pursue certain aims. (Keen 2008:173-175)

These issues are related to fundamental problems in post-war societies which until recently have been under-researched by academics and are underestimated by policy-makers: the question of the establishment of at least minimal standards of public security and the symbiotic relationship between political and 'criminal' forms of violence. These developments are closely related to the experience of war and to the deficits in the process of disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating ex-combatants as well as the entire population. Developments in Guatemala and Colombia are a case in point.

Beall et al. (2010) focus on the changing locations of violence, introducing the term 'civic conflict' for urbanized forms of collective violence. This spatial shift of violence is highly relevant for post-war and post-conflict societies because most wars lead to rapid urbanization as people seek refuge or are displaced by violence. While cities may be a safe heaven during war and armed conflict, this seems to change after war and armed conflict end.[24] The reasons for this are manifold: state institutions responsible for social services and the provision of security are mostly absent in

[23] See Darby 2001, 2006, Mac Ginty 2006, 2008, Keen 2008, Steenkamp 2009.
[24] Nevertheless, the consequences of urbanization are ambivalent as it also offers new opportunities for citizenship and civil engagement.

slums, and this provides opportunities for other actors (e.g. organized crime) to step in. The high density of urban spaces is another risk factor for violence. And last but not least, war and violent conflict change social relations, e.g. providing opportunities for women and youth to escape traditional gender- and age-based hierarchies. The rollback process after wars and conflicts end is highly conflict-prone.

Other consequences and legacies of war and conflict increase the risk of violence in these societies too. There is a high level of firearms circulation that does not necessarily increase violence but constitutes a problem, given the lack of functioning state and non-state mechanisms of violence control and sanctioning. This leads to a high level of privatization and diffusion of violence. At the same time, violence shifts from the political sphere into society. The main actors are not merely gangs of former ex-combatants who secure their daily survival using their gun, lacking other options (and capabilities). The main actors also include criminal groups that might not have been directly involved in the war but have benefited from the (post-)war power vacuum. In addition, the increase in domestic violence in almost every post-war society is rooted in these developments.

The assumption that there is a high risk of interpersonal violence in post-war and post-conflict contexts has a long academic tradition and has been investigated mostly for the aftermath of World War I and II. A quantitative analysis of 110 post-war societies between 1900 and 1970 finds some evidence for an increase in homicide after war's end but only in countries with a high level of battle-related deaths and (interestingly) in those that won (Archer/Gartner 1976). Hoeffler and Collier (2004) choose another focus, investigating whether their model on the explanation of the causes of armed conflict also applies for homicide rates in post-war and post-conflict contexts. They find that there is a high level of congruence in the causation of both, although there are differences in the level of GDP (relevant inversely for wars – low – and homicide – high). Factors that are discussed as causing war, such as the number of young men and changing the political regime (democratization), seem to be more relevant for homicides than for armed conflict. At the same time, homicide rates seem only to increase in the immediate aftermath of war and armed conflict while decreasing to pre-war levels after a five-year period. As the statistical evidence is low, Hoeffler and Collier (2004) reckon that factors beyond statistical measurability (e.g. lack of effective policing) might be responsible for the post-war and post-conflict increase in homicide rates.

2.2.3. Patterns of Post-war and Post-conflict Violence

Summarizing the discussion on relevant risk factors for continuing or even increased violence in post-war and post-conflict societies, four developments seem to be important:

First of all, neither military victory nor agreements, phasing out or external intervention tend to solve the causes of war and armed conflict in the short term. Thus violence may be reduced beneath the threshold of war or conflict definitions but can remain a daily social practice. Data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program

show how violence in wars and armed conflicts varies over time, making the definition of armed conflicts' or wars' beginning and end difficult.

Second, the design of war and armed conflict's termination can be a source of violence by spoilers who use violence to influence either the content of an agreement or to disrupt its implementation. Suhrke (2011:11) labels this as a "loser's peace" where "violence is unleashed to sabotage the new order". The present situation in Afghanistan illustrates the impact spoilers can have. Because of their influence in destabilizing the country, the Western powers are now preparing to channel money into a programme to offer a perspective to Taliban dropouts.[25]

Third, even in war and armed conflict, violence is not restricted to the formal battlefield but takes various forms and logics covered under the umbrella of war or armed conflict. In his study on the 'Logic of Violence in Civil War', Kalyvas (2006), based on very different historical and regional contexts, identifies the mixture of privatized, economic and political forms of violence and the resulting diverse logic of violence between the macro and the micro levels. Writing about Colombia, Waldmann (2002:2001ff) described this as a process of violence institutionalization. These quotidian violent practices will not end abruptly with the end of war or armed conflict. As Keen (2010:10) observes: "A 'transition from war to peace' is unlikely to see a clean break from violence to consent, from theft to production, from repression to democracy, or from impunity to accountability."

And last but not least, war and widespread violence and the modes of their termination influence and change the societies. This applies to the territorial distribution of the population as well as to the social fabric and power relations. Violence is an important push factor for rapid urbanization, creating the risk of changing patterns of violence and continuously high levels of violence after the end of war and armed conflict.

Hence the causes of violence in post-war and post-conflict contexts show patterns of continuity as well as patterns of change compared to war and armed conflict. This is the main reason for the changing forms and patterns of violence as well, complicating analysis and the development of intervention strategies. On the other hand, the framing of violence is decisive not only in relation to its legitimacy but also for the development of specific strategies to deal with it.

2.3. Framing Violence

Commonly, the line between war or armed conflict-related violence and post-war or post-conflict violence is drawn according to the question of political goals, spoiler violence being an exception. Most other attempts to disaggregate and systematize the various forms of direct physical violence have only occasionally related directly to

[25] For a background and details of the programme, see: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,725516,00.html.

the debate on violence in post-war and post-conflict societies.[26] Moser and Winton (2002) distinguish between political-institutional, economic and social violence representing different levels of organization and goals of violence. While political-institutional violence is related to collective conflicts on power, economic violence resembles common crime, and the term 'social violence' is related to interpersonal (mostly private) violence. Hence in post-war and post-conflict contexts, we would observe only economic and social violence, because otherwise there would be a recurrence of war or armed conflict.

A different approach is introduced by the Geneva Declaration (2008:50-58)[27], which distinguishes, in relation to the goals and the perpetrators, between political violence, routine state violence, economic and crime-related violence, community and informal justice and policing, post-war displacements and disputes. All these forms can be observed in war and armed conflict as well as in post-war and post-conflict situations, allowing us to identify patterns of continuity between these contexts of violence. But this typology does not allow us to analyze the interaction and interrelation between different forms of violence as it does not focus on continuity and change. Routine state violence against representatives of social or civil society organizations is a case in point, as even in cases where violence is selective it may contain a strong political message to the population, e.g. warning against political organization or participation in elections.

Under the perspective of violence and insecurity, Suhrke (2011) has developed a typology of post-war and post-conflict environments distinguishing not between variation in the levels of violence but on the differences in its aims, actors and purposes. Thus in contexts of a victor's peace, violence will mostly be related to the establishment and securing of the new order, pursued mainly by state agents and directed against the opposition. By contrast, in a loser's peace, vigilante-type violence will be used to sabotage the new order, while the targets are members of the local or national elite. The two other categories Suhrke develops are labeled 'divided peace' and 'pacified peace'. In the former, violence is restricted to certain areas in situations where agreements were not inclusive or did not reflect the balance of power on the ground. In the latter, settlement has been inclusive, allowing a high

[26] Crime statistics differentiate between offences, e.g. homicide, assault and robbery, but do not include other factors like context or perpetrator. Tilly (2003:12-16) develops a typology of interpersonal violence based on two criteria: the extent of coordination among violent actors (individual versus collective organization) and the salience of short-run damage. Fox and Hoelscher 2010 distinguish between social and political violence, assuming that social violence does not contest government authority. But even if this is the case, social violence does have serious implications for government authority and is political in the sense that it favours the persistence of the status quo (i.e. the unwillingness or inability of the government to achieve the monopoly of force) (see Kurtenbach 2011).

[27] This typology is based on an unpublished background paper by Chaudhary and Suhrke for the Global Burden of Armed Violence Report.

level of consensus. While this typology includes important factors, it mostly relies on categories of violence's continuation into war or armed conflict.[28]

Although difficult empirically, distinctions between the forms and expressions of post-war and post-conflict are a prerequisite for the development of intervention strategies by internal and external actors aiming at violence reduction and control. Situational violence, i.e. violence which is dependent on specific situations such as the influence of drugs and alcohol, may be reduced or controlled by curfews. Economic violence might be reduced by social integration or compensation mechanisms, while social and political violence responds to political mechanisms of participation, dialogue and transparency.[29] Hence it is essential to start with an analysis of the causes of violence in post-war and post-conflict situations.

2.4. Violence Control and Security

2.4.1. Violence Control in Fragile Situations

Insecurity is a central feature of post-war and post-conflict spaces as different forms of violence coalesce while functioning mechanisms to provide security rarely exist. At the same time, security or insecurity, for both ex-combatants and the general public, is an important indicator for advances or setbacks in war and armed conflict termination. Nevertheless, most interventions have focused on former fighters, their security gap (Walter 2002) and their potential as spoilers, while few have addressed "public safety toward protecting citizens rather than the regime" (Call/Stanley 2001:152). Under a societal focus, internal and external interventions need to use a broad range of tools to reduce and control violence, including the promotion of both state and non-state mechanisms (SSR and judicial reform, civil conflict regulation). At the same time, there is growing evidence that supporting good governance is an essential instrument not only in coping with existing forms of violence but also in preventing new or further escalation of violence (Walter 2010, Fearon 2010). This means that sequencing – security first, governance and development second – is not the best option. Interventions should aim to work like a zipper, integrating the support for (citizen) security with good governance (above all, transparency and accountability) and development. Otherwise, these policies will rarely be sustainable even if security improves. Hence the main challenge in post-conflict and post-war contexts is to reduce violence by mechanisms based on the rule of law and democratic control – a necessary but complicated endeavour.[30]

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[28] For a typology including not only the goals but also the levels of organization and time horizons of violence, see Kurtenbach (2008).

[29] Most donor agencies have separate units working on conflict-related (organized, collective, perhaps political) and interpersonal (less organized, individual, political only when widespread) violence. This resembles divisions, in accordance with academic research traditions, between psychological, sociological and political science approaches to violence. On the ground, many of these approaches need to be integrated, as in the German youth violence prevention strategy.

[30] Colombia and the experiences in Bogotá and Medellín provide interesting evidence for an integrated approach. The improvement of security in Colombia over the past decade is based overwhelmingly on a reduction of homicides in these two cities. The main success factors here have been political

Theoretically, violence can be controlled through different mechanisms along the spectrum of external coercion (police, military) and internal control (norms, values, socialization). In war and armed conflict, these mechanisms are non-existent or at least damaged. The police and military forces of the state or its equivalent are mostly a central part of and party to the conflict. At the same time, long-lasting and widespread violence influences the existing norms and values, lowering the individual and collective threshold for using violence. Different academic disciplines agree that for youth, the personal experience or observation of violence is one of the fundamental risk factors for violent behaviour across all contexts (see, for example, Brett/Specht 2004, Dowdney 2005).

The establishment of at least rudimentary forms of public security is a priority for most internal and external actors in post-war and post-conflict contexts. Programmes for the disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants are designed as a first step in this direction for a broader process of security sector reform. But as neither former combatants nor a state's security forces are the only actors responsible for violence and insecurity, security must go beyond the reform or re-establishment of the state's security forces.[31] A second pillar of violence control that has become more prominent in post-war and post-conflict contexts is judicial reform. A functioning judiciary is essential not only for sanctioning violence but also as an indicator for the reinforcement of non-violent mechanisms of conflict regulation.

Under the conditions of fragile post-war and post-conflict environments, the establishment of new, democratically controlled and accountable state organizations of security and an independent judiciary are hardly feasible on a short-term basis. This is one of the reasons for the relatively high level of violence that quantitative research has found in countries undergoing democratization, and which is described as a reversed U (see Hegre 2004): violence increases when existing forms of violence control and containment are destroyed and before new and functioning mechanisms are established. Processes of informalization and criminalization have an additional negative effect, undermining or blocking the necessary process of reform through either the threat and practice of violence or corruption.

While violence may be directly related to preventing the establishment of these institutions (e.g. spoiler violence), supposedly 'non-political' forms of violence also undermine the establishment of new democratically controlled security organizations and rule of law-based institutions, which would sanction and control violence. Compared to war-related violence, violence might be selective – either used against reform-oriented police officers, judges, and prosecutors – but equally leads to the perpetuation of a climate of fear and distrust and thus favours asymmetrical social relations.

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coalitions working for a recovery of the public space and social inclusion (see Gutierrez Sanin et al 2009).

[31] On different 'markets of security' in post-war societies, see Lambach (2007). On transformation processes and security sector reform, see Cawthra/Luckham 2003, on post-war contexts Holm/Espen 2000, Call/Staley 2001, Call/Cook 2003, Schnabel/Ehrhardt 2006, Call 2007.

From this perspective, violence control in post-war societies can be based on three different foundations:

- The reconstruction of traditional forms of violence control, e.g. through authoritarian regimes. This seems to be the case in Cambodia and Mozambique with comparatively low levels of violence but more or less failed processes of democratization.
- The modernization or reform of public security systems and the adaptation of the political regime to war-related changes. Success of violence reduction in this context depends on the integration or marginalization of potentially violent actors (spoilers or new actors of violence). Nicaragua is an interesting case in point, where a change of the political regime destroyed the pre-existing repressive security apparatus and established a new one without fundamentally changing the societal foundations.
- The rupture of the existing order and the establishment of a fundamentally new and different system. Here, two versions can be distinguished:

  a) the establishment of new states through independence or secession, as was the case in Timor L'Este or Namibia; or

  b) heavy footstep interventions, e.g. the establishment of international interim administrations or protectorates; Haiti and the Balkans are interesting examples.

Future development in these cases will ultimately depend on the question whether long-term path-dependent developments recur or whether the changes acquire momentum. In Haiti, the UN mission made considerable progress on the destruction of armed groups (before the earthquake) but it remains to be seen whether this process is stable enough when the UN troops leave the country. The fragile situation in Timor L'Este regarding violence control is obvious.

2.4.2. Concepts of External Actors

As violence and insecurity are major challenges in different contexts (among them post-conflict spaces) for external interventions in general and development cooperation specifically, there have been a series of studies and publications aiming to broaden the existing toolkit. The most relevant of these are the OECD/DAC's publication on Armed Violence Reduction (2009) and the World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development.

The most recent Small Arms Survey (Graduate Institute 2011) has a specific focus. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons is threatening since these are the weapons that are often used in conflicts. According to the Small Arms Survey, "the unchecked spread of these weapons has exacerbated inter- and intra-state conflicts, contributed to human rights violations, undermined political and economic development, destabilized communities, and devastated the lives of millions of

people."[32] The survey concludes that better information on the flow of these weapons is required in order to cope with this challenge. The 2011 report examines various aspects of the provision of security and looks specifically at private security companies and their stocks of firearms (see below).

The AVR (2009) focuses on armed violence in different contexts – among them post-conflict contexts as one of the 'new landscapes of insecurity'. But while the number of wars has decreased over the past decades, armed violence is still a major threat to development and security. This perception has become very prominent lately based on the observations of the Global Burden of Armed Violence Report (Geneva Declaration 2008), which claims that currently two thirds of the victims of armed violence die outside of collectively organized armed conflicts. Other reports note similar trends and see political violence, in the form of wars and armed conflicts, as being on the retreat (SIPRI 2011) and also point to shrinking costs of war (Human Security Centre 2010), while other patterns of violence, namely from gangs and organized crime, are on the increase (Human Security Report Project 2011). The problem with these observations is that useful data on wars and major armed conflicts are available but there are no systematic collections of current and historical data on different forms of violence (see Brzoska 2007). As a result, it is impossible to determine if there really are changing patterns of violence or just a change in awareness. Historiographical studies on violence and war show, for example, that there have been very different forms of violence in war beyond the "master cleavage" (Kalyvas 2006): rape and atrocities or massacres of civilians (women, children, non-combatants) are not new. What has changed is our increased awareness of, and focus on, these forms of violence due to international norms and standards prohibiting certain forms of violence.

Nevertheless, this focus is important in post-conflict contexts. While the AVR report identifies different policy and programming gaps (like the inadequate capacity to deal with the convergence of conflict and criminal violence, difficulties of programming above and below state level, or inexperienced programming in urban areas), it does not address the political problem of the framing of violence. This is a major challenge for donors as it is highly politicized in post-conflict contexts, legitimizing or criminalizing the use of force as well as certain policies of violence reduction. Outside support for specific policy approaches (like a tough stance on youth) may be counterproductive, fuelling and institutionalizing violence.

The WDR 2011 has similar problems. It does not use the term 'post-conflict' but focuses on 'recurring cycles of violence' and on violence prevention and recovery. While these perspectives are useful and necessary, they too fail to address the specific political problems of post-conflict social spaces (see section 2. above). The emphasis in the WDR on trust, institution-building and jobs is a good example. While these are issues of high importance, the main problem in post-conflict contexts is to identify actors willing and most of all capable of addressing the necessary reforms. While most will do so on a rhetorical level, implementation of reforms is politically very

[32] Small Arms Survey Website: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/about-us/mission.html.

sensitive as it may change existing power relations and access to and control of resources (human and material). While 'inclusive enough' coalitions are important, other actor constellations may dominate.

Although it is evident – and there is some statistical proof (see Walter's 2010 background paper for the WDR) – that institutions and confidence in the way they function are important to prevent violence, the main challenges in post-conflict contexts are related to power relations and power asymmetries impacting not only on the design of these institutions but also on the way they work. The persistence of war economies after war's end is a case in point. The related structures (and actors) do not only control economic resources (which could be used for development) but also influence the institutions and the political system (e.g. via corruption) and may provide jobs in the informal or criminal economy for young people. The challenge for development cooperation in these contexts is to find suitable entry points for addressing the related problems in an integrated way.

The WDR identifies four tracks to improve global responses, but only one (track 1: investing in citizen security, justice, and jobs) addresses the specific problems of violence-ridden contexts, while the other three focus on inter-agency cooperation and the organization of support. But the adaptation of instruments and procedures to deal with post-conflict violence and insecurity will only bear fruit if and when the underlying political problems and dynamics are understood. The following discussion of security sector reform and disarmament, demilitarization and reintegration approaches shows this.

From the perspective of violence reduction and coping with insecurity, internal and external actors – including development cooperation – in these contexts will face different challenges, as well as windows of opportunities. Hence a sound analysis is a precondition for the identification of strategies and interventions. From a societal perspective and including patterns of social change, the following table summarizes the above considerations and helps to identify patterns of continuity and change. Violence and insecurity in post-war and post-conflict societies can be framed in an onion pattern or a stage model where different layers of risk factors can (but not necessarily do) accumulate or can be reduced or controlled. The level of post-war and post-conflict violence on the ground will depend on the capacities of actors in state and society to implement the necessary policies.

Table 4: Violence and Violence Control in Post-war and Post-conflict Contexts

Violence related to the dynamics of	Causes and risk factors	Possibilities for violence control and reduction
Unresolved conflicts and causes of war and armed conflict	Vertical and horizontal inequality, lack of participation, identity issues, etc.	Civil conflict regulation and prevention
Legacies of widespread violence	Disruption of social fabric, rapid urbanization, polarization	Reconciliation, promotion of inclusive forms of social cohesion
Consequences of conflict and war termination and its modes	Regime change, power vacuum, winners and losers	International presence, mechanisms of compensation

While this section has analyzed the complex environment in post-conflict and post-war societies, the following will change the perspective and deal with the different approaches developed by external actors to cope with insecurity in contexts in between war and peace.

3. Security, Insecurity and the Monopoly of Force

We have argued in the introduction that there has been a shift towards less organized, less political and more localized forms of violence. This has implications for security (or insecurity) in many countries. International politics in general and development aid in particular have reacted since this situation poses a challenge to the functioning of the international system, regional and national security and the implementation of development projects.

The costs of violence have become a focus of attention and a number of concepts have been designed to cope with this challenge: peacekeeping and peace-building, democratization and humanitarian intervention, state- and institution-building, reform of state institutions and transformation of societal structures.

Security sector reform (SSR), included in many peace agreements, is one of these new concepts, particularly in post-conflict. It is one of the major donor-driven attempts to grapple with insecurity and is included in many reconstruction, reconciliation and political reform programmes described above (see Table 3). SSR programmes in countries with inadequate or weak institutions of governance are intended to boost the efficiency of the security sector and subject it to civilian and, as far as possible, democratic control.

Privatization of security provision is another important new development. As a reaction to prevailing insecurity, both governments and private actors task companies (private military and security companies) with providing protection. But in contrast to security sector reform, the privatization (or commercialization) of many functions of the armed forces or police has been pursued as part of a wider process of deregulation and outsourcing of government functions. This policy can entail conflicting goals: security sector reform is about strengthening the state's monopoly of force; privatization, by contrast, partly outsources this monopoly to private actors. We will look at the trend to privatize and commercialize security and consider what this means for economic cooperation.

When development cooperation became engaged in security issues, naturally the relationship between military and non-military actors also emerged on the agenda, occasionally in controversial forms. Civil-military cooperation is a popular but contested concept in an area in which the different logics of the military and development offer new opportunities but also seem to clash in critical situations.

Since the level of violence plays an important role in post-war and post-conflict societies (see section 2.2. above), the security issue is of great importance for the effective operation of development programmes, including its effects on the security of aid workers. Violence control and the provision of security are a significant frame of reference for implementing development cooperation. However, as we have argued above, functioning mechanisms to provide security are often absent in post-conflict societies. The following section will address these issues in the light of recent experiences.

3.1. Security Sector Reform: A Popular Concept

3.1.1. Concepts and Approaches

The development approach most directly related to coping with insecurity in post-conflict situations is security sector reform (SSR) and demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR), considered here as part of SSR. The concept of SSR is a sub-theme of the wider security and development nexus, which has framed the debate on global development since the mid-1990s. SSR is a relatively recent concept in state transformation, development and post-conflict peace-building. SSR is called for when large-scale violence or war has ended. The advance of SSR in development is the result of the concepts of democratizing societies, good governance with transparency and accountability, peaceful transformation of societies and human security, which have made inroads in security thinking (Ball et al 2003).

Security sector reform addresses security problems and tries to improve the situation through institutional reforms. It seeks to align the contributions of military, diplomatic, development and security actors. Civilian (and possibly also democratic) control over security forces is crucial for the provision of security in the interests of the population. Democratic decision-making requires transparency and accountability. Thus, the public at large needs to be involved. Hence, the crux of the reform of the security sector is the development of both effective civil oversight and creation of institutions capable of providing security.

Box 1: Four Core Objectives of SSR

As defined by the OECD/DAC Handbook on Security System Reform:

- Establishment of effective governance, oversight and accountability in the security system;
- Improved delivery of security and justice services;
- Development of local leadership and ownership of the reform process;
- Sustainability of justice and security service delivery.

OECD/DAC 2007a, 21.

The concept of security sector reform has become increasingly popular since it was first put forward to a larger public in a speech by Clare Short, then United Kingdom Minister for International Development, in London in 1998 (Short 1999). Its appeal lies in the visionary integration of a number of objectives under one intellectual roof: the reduction of military expenditures and their redirection to development purposes;[33] security-relevant development; donor activities in conflict prevention and post-conflict situations; arms control agendas; and improvement in the efficiency and effectiveness of governance over those institutions charged with the provision of security (Brzoska 2003).

In short, security sector reforms aims at (1) developing a clear institutional framework for the provision of security that integrates security and development policy and includes all relevant actors; (2) strengthening the governance of security institutions; and (3) building capable and professional security forces, accountable to civil authorities (OECD 2007a).

3.1.2. Objectives

SSR is driven by the understanding that an ineffective and poorly governed security sector is a major obstacle to peace, stability, poverty reduction, sustainable development, rule of law, good governance, and respect for human rights. The underlying assumption is that responsible and accountable security forces reduce the risk of conflict.

In recent years, the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/DAC) has provided principles and guidelines for SSR (OECD 2007a). The OECD/DAC emphasizes that there are many sub-sectors of the security sector which reform should address. Quantitatively, the armed forces are by far the largest part of the security sector. Other potential reform sub-sectors in which core security sector actors operate are police, gendarmeries, paramilitary forces, presidential guards, intelligence services, coastguards, border guards, customs and immigration, reserves, correctional services and the judiciary,

[33] There are no systematic studies available which have verified that such a redirection of funds has actually taken place. The potential afforded by the reallocation of resources from military to development purposes was presented as the core argument in the famous Brandt Report by the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, published in 1980.

but also civil society, NGOs, media and ombudsmen. In other concepts, non-statutory forces – liberation or guerrilla armies, private bodyguard units, private security companies, and militias – are included and emphasis is laid on the role of civil society.

Over the past few years, the debate on security sector reform has gathered momentum within the international donor community and in developing countries. Donors have recognized that a process of sustainable development cannot ignore the security sector and its actors. In the past, external support for the security sector was often provided (military assistance) or withheld for strategic and political reasons. In recent years, donors have emphasized that sustainable development and peace-building must be based on strengthening governance in the security sector in order to remove the barriers to the state's ability to provide security for its citizens as well as the threats to citizens' security.

A comprehensive concept of SSR addresses four dimensions (Brzoska 2000, Wulf 2000, 19-23):

- The political dimension: democratic, civilian oversight of the security sector forces.
- The economic dimension: the allocation of resources. Reform includes identifying needs and key objectives, determining what is affordable, prioritizing resource allocation and ensuring the efficient and effective use of resources.
- The social dimension: the actual guarantee of citizens' security.
- The institutional dimension: the structure of the security sector (its right-sizing) and the institutional separation of the various forces and institutions.

SSR should take place in post-conflict situations, according to the established norms, in order to overcome the security deficit and to assist in peace- and state-building. SSR and especially the OECD Handbook on SSR (OECD/DAC 2007a) are largely donor-driven projects which aim to reshape the security and justice sectors in client states in the Weberian-Westphalian format.

More specifically, security-related programmes overcome the legacies of violence, the weakness of the state monopoly of force and the lack of civil society's oversight capacities, promote the integration of ex-combatants and small arms control, and support the establishment of the rule of law in order to combat crime and violence (Wulf 2010, Table 4). It has been argued that the focus on the crimes committed during the conflict could set reform back. In Nepal, for example, despite some external assistance since the peace accord in 2006, there has not been much progress in SSR and ex-rebels are still based in cantonments and have not been reintegrated. The two formerly warring sides' positions appear to be as entrenched as they were during the conflict (ICG 2010, 3).

3.1.3. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)

SSR is sometimes defined to include disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and initiatives relating to small arms and light weapons (SALW). This aspect of SSR is primarily seen as a violence reduction agenda. Post-conflict demobilization and disarmament of ex-combatants have long been understood as a key component of re-establishing peace and stability (Muggah and Krause 2009). However, a narrow focus on disarming ex-combatants (or on the collection of arms) fails to understand the various different categories of violence before, during and after war.

DDR programmes are the result of two distinct developments: (1) drastic personnel reductions in the armed forces after the end of the Cold War and (2) reform and restructuring of the armed forces after the end of conflicts.

DDR programmes came to prominence after the end of the Cold War when many armed forces reduced their personnel drastically. Worldwide reduction of military personnel in the decade following the end of the Cold War amounted to a total of over 6.7 million people (from 28.3 to 21.6 million). Demobilization in developing countries led to a shrinkage of armed forces personnel in the order of 2.7 million soldiers (from 17 to 14.3 million). Due to the magnitude of the reduction, the task was enormous and not all demobilized personnel were properly disarmed, nor did all of them find alternative civilian employment.

Figure 2: Reduction in Military Personnel, 1990 – 2000 (in millions)



Source: BICC 2002, p. 163

Numerous additional DDR programmes were initiated during the last decade, particularly in countries where conflicts ended, with a strong focus on African nations. The UN Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre list several ongoing UN DDR operations in Africa (Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan), special political missions and DDR (Burundi, Central African Republic, Somalia) and two concluded DDR programmes (Liberia and Sierra Leone).[34] A new and seldom-applied approach in the 1970s and 1980s, DDR has now

[34] http://www.unddr.org/index.php

become a regular feature of UN peacekeeping operations. According to a recent statistic, more than 50 programmes have been initiated, the majority in Africa (see Table 5).

Table 5: Geographical Distribution of DDR, 1974 - 2009

Region	Number of operations
Africa	34
Central America	3
Caribbean	2
South America	1
Asia	8
Pacific	2
Balkans	2

Source: Muggah and Krause 2009, 138

The disarmament phase recognizes that former combatants (regular forces, militias, or rebel groups) often keep their weapons and thus continue to be a source of armed violence. Disarmament and demobilization are meant to eliminate short-term threats to security and stability. The reintegration phase is the most complicated since the ex-combatants are not easy to reintegrate into civilian economic and social life, especially when they have no skills alongside their military training. Sometimes they are marginalized even if the forces they served in were undefeated. Both analysts and practitioners have recognized that factors such as the general state of the post-war economy and the willingness of the communities to welcome their sons (and sometimes daughters) back from war play a critical role (Kingma 2009, 70). Economic opportunities, access to land, non-military skills development etc. are key factors in the success of DDR and are concrete entry points for economic cooperation programmes and for sustainable development relating to DDR.

Box 2: Competing Goals of Economic Cooperation in DDR Support

A central dilemma and a conflicting goal of development policy in support of DDR is whether to specifically target ex-combatants – given the usual scarcity of resources – or to provide broader community-based support. Rapid stabilization of a fragile peace process or reduction of armed violence can probably best be achieved by direct assistance to ex-combatants, but this can also create discontent in the wider public. In such situations, there is a need to strictly apply 'do-no-harm' principles. This plays an important role in places where the numbers of conflict-affected persons such as returning refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs) are much larger than the number of ex-combatants; this is the case in the war-torn societies in West Africa, for example. The choice is between two potentially competing objectives: eliminating short-term threats to stability, and the broader stability and development goal. It is essential to find some sort of a balance between supporting former fighters and civilians affected by the violent conflicts.

3.1.4. Principles of Reform

It is very difficult to generalize about the nature and the required steps of security sector reform, since the specific political, economic and social conditions and regional constellations need to be taken into account. The context in which the security sector is to be reformed is vital, and the differences in the various countries are as critical as their commonalities. The reform has technical components (especially the institutional dimension with training and capacity-building) but it is not simply aimed at making the security and justice services more efficient and effective.

SSR is profoundly political. The reform focuses on the state's most sensitive sector; power relations are questioned and vested interests are challenged. Not all the goals are automatically subscribed to by the international or the local actors. On the contrary, there is the danger that SSR can be used for military and strategic purposes that are often in conflict with the development agenda. At the local level, in the areas of governance, post-conflict and high-criminality situations, resistance to reform must be expected since vested interest are targeted by SSR. Therefore, it is important to work with the right partners. In post-conflict countries, SSR is partly welcomed, while in some parts of the world it is seen as an imposition of Western values, methods and approaches in an area that lies at the heart of national security concerns. Security sector actors have often played dubious roles that might disqualify them, such as the military juntas in Latin America. In many cases, partnership in security sector reform will be more complicated than in other fields of foreign policy or economic cooperation. It might even be necessary for maintaining the integrity of development cooperation to reduce or even decline cooperation – for instance with a corrupt judicial apparatus – or to turn down training programmes for the armed forces where there is a risk that direct military assistance may promote or legitimize activities that endanger human security.

Local ownership and consideration of the causes of conflict are cornerstones in SSR. Local ownership means that the reform process is shaped and driven by local actors. The literature and donor standards have embraced this principle and look at it as a precondition for sustainability of the reform. In practice, however, the principle is sometimes very difficult to apply (Nathan 2008). In addition, ambitions to reform the security sector have to consider the underlying causes of violence for such programmes to succeed. Removing these causes of violence and wars confronting many societies and laying the basis for peace and development can only be a long-term endeavour. Security sector reform mainly addresses the symptoms of violent conflicts and aims at short or medium term adjustments to facilitate the long-term process.

Gender mainstreaming is important in SSR. Men are often over-represented in the security sector, and many issues that directly affect women, girls and marginalized men and boys are often neglected in SSR reforms. The OECD/DAC has specifically addressed this issue in its Handbook on Security Sector Reform (OECD/DAC 2007a, section 9).

A *holistic approach, policy coherence and setting of priorities are needed*. Tackling the interconnected problems of weak governance, poor economic performance, insecurity and poverty, SSR requires a holistic approach. As a result, the OECD/DAC has formulated the need for a whole-of-government approach in SSR. But donor policy coherence is often lacking. Donor policies are often not harmonized, but in many cases are diametrically opposed. Many international organizations that promote democracy as a universal norm do not necessarily adhere to these norms. The real litmus test in security sector reform for donors is the question of whether defence relations (especially arms export interests) are considered within their security sector reform programmes. None of the major donors seem willing to do this but pursue their arms export interests through their economic and foreign trade ministries and agencies while their foreign offices and economic cooperation agencies pursue the security sector reform agenda. Policy-makers have to set priorities. They must weigh up many different but relevant objectives, like poverty reduction, improvement of health situations, improvement of water supply, etc., against the need for security sector reform. Measures to increase public security can require the allocation of substantial resources – resources that might be needed for other programmes. Given the scarcity of funds, it will be necessary to set priorities.

3.1.5. Results of Reform and Transformation

The situation in many countries, including post-conflict countries, urgently in need of security sector reform is not exactly an enabling environment.[35] Violent conflict has remained endemic, despite intense efforts, in a number of regions. However, to expect peace to stabilize a society without touching the security sector is wishful thinking.

The engagement in security sector reform has taught some lessons to both the international community and the countries undergoing reform. Traditional military and police assistance programmes of the Cold War period have little in common with the requirements of security sector reform. Among the most important lessons learned by the international community are

- the need to acknowledge that countries and, more so, communities have legitimate security needs,
- the necessity of comprehensive and coherent external assistance,
- the need to secure the commitment of national and local leadership,
- the indispensability of carefully designed confidence-building measures in overcoming the suspicion between the security forces and the civilian population,

[35] For case studies on security sector reform across the globe, see the edited volumes of Schnabel/Erhardt 2006, Muggah 2008, Berdal 2009, Toft 2010, DCAF Yearbooks. An additional source is the website of the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, which includes numerous publications and case studies (http://www.ssrnetwork.net/regions/southeast.php).

- the requirement for a long-term perspective and commitment, not least to ensure a continuum from reintegration of ex-combatants to sustainable development,
- the requirement to establish a civilian-led governance structure, and
- the danger of misusing SSR and development assistance for non-development purposes.

Security sector reform, so far, has a mixed record in post-conflict societies because the externally brokered and assisted reform has primarily addressed the warring parties with the most direct involvement in violence, rather than the forces advocating peace. This again points to potentially competing goals of development policy. Such a short-term focus was often necessary to secure the end of hostilities. Nevertheless, it seems that fundamental changes in society, like a regime change or the end of war, are a solid ground for far-reaching reforms, while relatively stable societies are slow to implement security sector reforms seriously. Five remaining, often unresolved issues are the cause of a continued disjuncture (Ball and Hendrickson 2009, Bryden and Olonisakin 2010, Wulf 2010):

1. Only limited knowledge about the success or failure of SSR measures is available. There have been a number of evaluations of SSR programmes, but no systematic review of the SSR agenda of the last dozen years has been carried out. Instead, SSR is promoted (mainly by the donor countries and organizations) with a heavy normative emphasis on democratic control, civilian oversight and development orientation.
2. There is an uneven 'buy-in' to the SSR policy agenda. Some governments in donor countries are more forthcoming in promoting SSR; others emphasize the political sensitivity of the security sector, especially regarding the reform of the armed forces and intelligence services, and are cautious in their engagement. Many governments in recipient countries are not fully committed to SSR. They pay lip service to democratic accountability and human rights at best and actively resist them at worst. In Africa, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America, SSR often remains peripheral to government agendas. Some progress has been made by embedding SSR principles in regional and global governance institutions (e.g. African Union, European Commission, UN) (African Union 2006, European Commission 2006, UN Secretary-General 2008).
3. The concept of SSR is not always clear. A growing number of issues related to security have been relabelled as SSR; the approach has thus been diluted. The issue of what or who should be included in SSR remains contested.
4. There are differing donor interests, objectives, working cultures and practices which have made it difficult to harmonize international policies in the security arena. The UK government department responsible for development, DFID, for example, strongly supports security sector reform as an important development issue. In the United States, in contrast, work on SSR has been driven in large part by the US Department of Defense and has been carried out, to a significant

degree, by private contractors. The German government has pursued a cautious approach and has carefully screened when and when not to engage in SSR.

5. Due to the 'war on terror', US government policy favours countries that join in this 'war' (most typically Pakistan). Many of these countries are aid-dependent and rely on external military assistance for their armed forces. This leads to an emphasis on tradition 'hard' security approaches while 'soft' security issues (like governance and civilian control of the security actors) are a constituent element of SSR.

3.2. Privatizing Security: Endangering the State Monopoly of Force

3.2.1. Deregulating Security

The approach to privatizing security tasks differs completely from security sector reform. Privatization of traditional armed and police forces' functions is a deliberate policy to use actors and their know-how outside the public domain; security sector reform is intended to strengthen the state's monopoly of force. The trend to commercialize security has direct and indirect repercussions for development cooperation since the type of security provision (public or private) and the institutionalization of the state monopoly of force (or its delegation to private actors) are distinct governance issues. Governance, in turn, has increasingly been recognized as an important field for economic cooperation.

Two different forms of privatizing security can be discerned. First, more and more often, warlords, organized crime, militias, rebels and even youth gangs and child soldiers act in wars and violent conflicts. This process has been classified as 'bottom-up' privatization of violence, which is largely due to the failure of states, with many governments no longer capable of guaranteeing law and order due to the weakness of their police and armed forces. Second, in parallel to this bottom-up privatization, another form of 'top-down' privatization (or commercialization) is taking place: deliberately, planned, propagated and implemented by some governments, it entails the outsourcing of police and military functions to private companies (Singer 2003; Avant 2005; Wulf 2005; Alexandra et al. 2008).

These two forms of privatization of security, both of them not entirely new, have different implications in post-conflict, although they are often connected. 'Bottom-up' privatization is often a legacy of previous wars, and governments in unstable situations find it difficult to deal with these private security actors adequately. In many post-conflict countries, this form of activity by private violent actors continues to pose problems for the transition of the society from war to peace. The various forms and causes of this violence have been described above (see section 2.).

'Top-down' privatization is pursued by various governments – especially in the US and the United Kingdom – as a targeted policy to privatize traditional military and police functions. In line with the concept of the 'lean state', which involves deregulation of many sectors and restriction of the state's role to core competences, the wave of privatization and outsourcing has not stopped at the gates of military

bases and police institutions. While the first form illustrates the limitations of the state monopoly of force, the second form actually delegates the state monopoly of force to private actors, often without the necessary public control mechanisms in place.

The deliberate 'top-down' commercialization and the contracting of private military and security firms are the result of both push and pull factors. Over the past decade, many governments have found it increasingly difficult to recruit enough qualified uniformed personnel for their combat and post-conflict operations. They have consequently come to depend more and more on private military and security companies for training, repair and maintenance of weapons systems and vehicles, for the collection of intelligence, for interrogation of prisoners of war, for asset protection and for supplying food and clean uniforms to troops and police personnel in the operational theatre. Hundreds of private military and security companies have sprung up, keen to cash in on this opportunity.

Contractors are not only hired to provide support during pre-war preparation and in war, but increasingly do so in post-war programmes as well. Life in many post-conflict countries is dangerous. The reasons for the insecure situation are manifold. The problem of insecurity is solved in the 'classical' concept of state-building through disarmament of private citizens or groups and the establishment of a state monopoly of force. This has not yet been achieved in cases like Afghanistan or the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but it is also far from perfect in cases like Nepal (with continuing political divergences), Sri Lanka (where the root causes of the conflict have not been removed), Somalia (where the state literally collapsed) or in Colombia and Mexico (where the state is not fully in control of certain territories). The privatization phenomenon can be observed in many other countries too.

Precise data on the size and duration of external interventions like peacekeeping operations of the UN or other bodies like ISAF in Afghanistan or the AU in East Africa are readily available in the public domain. While such interventions, intended to stabilize the country and to provide security, are often in the focus of attention, private military and security firms' activities remain, with the exception of regular scandals, mostly outside public visibility and are insufficiently controlled. Based on a review of 70 countries, the Small Arms Survey 2011 estimates that the formal private security sector employs between 19.5 and 25.5 million people worldwide – more than the number of police officers at the global level. The Small Arms Survey team estimates, on the basis of extrapolated case studies, that private security companies hold between 1.7 and 3.7 million firearms worldwide (Graduate Institute 2011, Chapter 4).

3.2.2. The Case of Afghanistan

The privatization trend in Afghanistan, in reality a combination of the 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' approaches, illustrates the dilemma that is not unfamiliar in many countries, although not as drastically as in Afghanistan. The worsening security

situation, a result of insurgencies, is countered both by deploying more military forces and police and by hiring private security actors in their tens of thousands.

For the development and humanitarian community to work effectively, a minimum of security is required. This security cannot at present be provided by the Afghan and foreign governments' own security personnel, be they armed forces or police. Private military and security companies offer their services and many local and foreign institutions, including development organizations and NGOs, have accepted such services, even including armed protection in some instances.

Afghanistan is at present the most interesting market for privatized security: large and small companies as well as individual war adventurers quickly realized that Afghanistan's war chest offers ample opportunities to make money. Large foreign companies and Afghan clan leaders run many of these private firms (Sherman and DiDomenico 2009, 1). At the same time, the reputable companies do have something to offer, which is why development organizations make use of their services. Nobody really knows how many of these contractors, often also labelled as mercenaries, are working for the Afghan government in Kabul, for the armed forces at the frontline or for development and humanitarian organizations in logistics and in property or personal protection. Many of the contractors are armed and dressed in self-styled company uniforms. Afghanistan has tighter regulations than many other countries, including Iraq; nevertheless, their role remains suspect (Sherman and DiDomenico 2009, 2). A report by the US Congressional Research Service quotes analysts who conclude that regulations governing private security companies (PSCs) are only enforced in Kabul; "outside Kabul there is no government reach at present and local governors, chiefs of police, and politicians run their own illegal PSCs" (Schwartz 2010, 4).

It is questionable whether the concept of sending more troops and police to stabilize Afghanistan or to create reliable state institutions will be successful. Military actions are usually followed by new insurgencies. The disarmament of non-state actors – a precondition to create a state monopoly of force – was not successful in the past. Mujahedeen leaders, warlords and other local leaders are now 'privatizing' the state security apparatus. Their power rests on their inclusion in central government as well as on income from the war economy (large amounts of aid disappear through corruption from which the war lords and even the Taliban profit) and shadow economy (drugs). More than 63,000 Afghan fighters took part in the official disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme between 2004 and 2006. But only one quarter of those demobilized found permanent civilian jobs (Ruttig 2008, 21). As in many countries, the third phase of the DDR programme, reintegration, did not work well in Afghanistan. Also, the disarmament programme was implemented half-heartedly. Members of some of the militias became auxiliary police, others have retained both their weapons and their status as illegal armed groups until today, and others were hired by private military and security firms.

US Congress report by the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrates the dimension of this 'secret' force. According to the Commission (2009, 16), the number of contract personnel of the Pentagon amounted

to 242,647 people in Asia in the 2nd quarter of 2009. Of these, 133,610 were contracted in Iraq, 68,197 in Afghanistan and 41,850 in other South Asian countries. One year later, the number in Afghanistan is estimated to be around 70,000 (Schwartz, 2010, 4). Not all of them are armed. But their number has increased considerably over the past year and a Congressional Research Report (Schwartz 2010) reports the number of armed security contractors for March 2010 as 16,398, an increase of 217% in a period of nine months.

Figure 3: Number of Armed Security Contractors of the US Department of Defense (DOD) in Afghanistan



Source: Schwartz, 2010, p. 11, based on DOD data

Jobs at private military and security companies are attractive. The contractors are much better paid and better armed than the members of the Afghan armed forces or the police.

It is not just the Pentagon that contracts these firms; the same is true of other ISAF armed forces, Afghan ministries and civilian NGOs. Nobody knows exactly how many are employed in Afghanistan – not even the UN, which is the official coordinating body for reconstruction, nor the US and Afghan governments. The above-mentioned report by the US Congress Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan mentions that more than 80% of the contractors are not US citizens. The companies recruit worldwide: primarily, of course, in Afghanistan, but also in Chile, Russia, Germany, Fiji, Nepal, South Africa, Kosovo etc. Young men with war experience and training in special operations, members of special forces, rebel groups and militias are particularly sought after. The companies tender for contracts and hire chains of sub-contractors. Who is deployed where and for what purpose is usually beyond the control of the contracting authority. Companies act as a

state within the state and US DOD officials "believe that poor contractor oversight has significantly contributed to contractor abuses" (Schwartz 2010, II).

The findings of the congressional report (Commission on Wartime Contracting 2009, 17) illustrate the lack of control and accountability. The report revealingly states: "There is still no clear picture of who the contractors are, what services they provide, which contracts they perform, and what their support costs are," despite the fact that they are hired by the Department of Defense. A lot remains in the dark and neither the hearings in Congress, nor public criticism and casulties[36] among the contractors have led to a reversal of privatizing military and other security tasks. More and more security-relevant missions are carried out by private companies, some with dubious reputations, as the scandals surrounding US companies, such as Blackwater, now re-named Xe, illustrate.

According to the 'new strategy', announced at the January 2010 London Afghan conference, police training and capacity-building are priorities now. But this has been practised since 2004 by the US companies Dyncorp and MPRI. They offer two- to eight-week crash courses in police services in which they train thousands of Afghans, mainly in anti-terror fighting. The reason for these company activities is a lack of police in the Western countries who are willing to volunteer for the dangerous job in Afghanistan. Past experience has shown that those trained and their weapons can end up with the Taliban.[37]

3.2.3. Reasons for the Privatization Boom

Iraq and Afghanistan are extreme examples, but by no means unique. Whether it is engagement in the anti-drug campaign in Colombia, the former civil war in the West African country of Sierra Leone, in the conflict zone in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa, or in the Balkans – the 'specialists' are always involved.

Originally, the US Department of Defense had contracted private companies to save money. The private sector, according to the New Public Management paradigm, works more efficiently than the armed forces. But in the meantime, doubts are being cast on this belief of cost efficiency. The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (2009, 27) offers some painful conclusions: "Based on an analysis of data covering some $43 billion in high-value awards to 15 contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, we learned that roughly 30 percent of contractor business systems audited by the Defense Contract Audit Agency contained significant deficiencies… Contractor billing systems and estimating systems were deficient at even greater rates – 50 and 42 percent, respectively." Companies charge for services that nobody can really control.

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[36] According to DOD, from June 2009 to April 2010, 260 private security contractor personnel working for DOD were killed in Afghanistan, compared to 324 US troops killed over the same period (Schwartz 2010, 12).

[37] Given the complex situation in Afghanistan, not only the private actors but also state and multilateral organizations are faced with the phenomenon that the results of their engagement might benefit the Taliban.

Despite these findings, it can be expected that further contracts will be signed with private military and security firms in the future. The criticism at home about the military engagement in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere and about the deployment of more soldiers and police is becoming increasingly vocal in many countries. These privately organized alternative power centres might possibly improve the security of foreign troops, diplomats and expatriates in the short term. This policy, however, is a long-term burden at the expense of the authority of the governments in developing countries since their monopoly of force is questioned. Furthermore, it also usually takes place at the expense of the security of the local population who cannot afford to hire private security firms for their personal protection.

As private military/security companies are not part of a clearly demarcated industry and there is no standard classification of companies operating in this sector, no firm statements can be made about their growth over the past decade. However, empirical evidence (such as companies' internet presence, media reports, and the debate within the military) points to rapid and substantial growth. A key factor driving this industry growth is that some military and police forces are over-burdened by the increasing number of tasks in conflict and post-conflict situations. Hence, there is an increasing demand for such services. Besides this demand-side factor, many other military, economic, political, and ideological reasons for the commercialization or privatization of the state's monopoly of force can also be identified, including the availability of skilled personnel (often ex-combatants) and the governments' deliberately planned privatization (Wulf 2005).

Most German NGOs have no systematic policies regarding the use of private military or security firms for their protection. In most cases they decide on the spot ad hoc according to needs. Often this started simply by hiring guards for property protection individually, generally on the basis of their embassy's policy. GTZ (now GIZ) has issued a paper entitled "Empfehlungen der GTZ Krisenleitstelle für die Nutzung von privaten Sicherheitsfirmen", (GTZ 2009). The paper presents the different options and calls for minimum requirements of transparency and accountability when hiring such firms. The GTZ Krisenleitstelle advises its field offices to check not only the security companies' professional capabilities, but also to request references and monitor the reputation of the companies concerned. The field offices are particularly advised to check the companies' policies regarding the use of force and weapons and if the companies have subscribed to the code of conduct of the security companies' professional associations (GTZ 2009, 8-9). The final decision to hire security companies rests with the field offices. Given the often localized forms of violence and the weak structures of the public security services, development organizations may face a dilemma, as an interviewee emphasized: "If in countries with high crime rates the situation gets too dangerous and you cannot rely on the police – you might even end up at the police station and face the very same people in police uniform that

have attacked you – you have to consider hiring the services of companies. If the state does not possess the monopoly of force, what can we do?"[38]

3.2.4. The Need for Regulation of Private Actors

Privatizing security services is exactly the opposite of a state monopoly of force. This policy contradicts the concept of creating efficient state institutions. Only when such firms are tightly and systematically regulated and controlled – an impossible task, given the weak state structures in most post-conflict countries – should the state delegate security services to private actors. In present circumstances, such companies are rivals or opponents of state authorities, although they often offer services to organizations looking for protection.

Their services might be urgently required. Nevertheless, from a governance policy perspective, this trend is highly problematical. The key to the modern 'Westphalian' nation-state is the monopoly of legitimate, organized force. As one of its core functions, the modern state has a duty to ensure the security of its citizens based on the rule of law; indeed, this is regarded as one of the main achievements of a civilized society.[39] Privatizing security functions raises fundamental issues about the future of the state's monopoly of force. The clear trend towards outsourcing entails the delegation of the state's monopoly of force without adequate regulation of the private actors entrusted with these tasks.

The fact is that neither the national laws nor international law provide an adequate legal basis on which to exercise oversight of private military and security firms and their employees, or call them to account for violations. Soldiers are subject to military jurisdiction, and international treaties such as the 1949 Geneva Convention and its 1977 additional protocols can also be applied to the armed forces. But these rules do not apply to private military contractors. The Swiss government has recently taken the initiative and drafted a Global Code of Conduct for Private Security Companies and Private Military Companies and has invited other governments, industry representatives and NGOs to join its initiative.[40]

Regulations are urgently needed. At present, the private military and security companies exercise military or police powers, but are generally not accountable or subject to public oversight or legislation. The law of the market prevails. Even the Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, whose government has hired such companies for personal protection, has threatened recently to cancel all contracts with private security firms, since they hire too many local people at the expense of an effective Afghan police force. In principle, companies can offer their services to anyone willing to pay. Various options are available for controlling the burgeoning and unregulated activities of private military companies, including a total ban, reliance on

[38] Interview with a representative of a German development agency.
[39] Criticisms of this model and its transfer to developing countries are based on sound arguments. See, for example, Boege, Brown, Clements and Nolan 2009.
[40] http://www.dcaf.ch/privatisation-security/PSC%20-%202010-10-08%20-%20International%20Code%20of%20Conduct_final.pdf.

self-regulation by the companies themselves, registration, licensing or international and national regulations or sanctions.

There are various partly complementary options for the regulation of private military companies, summarized in the table below:[41]

Table 6: Options for the Regulation of Private Military and Security Companies

Type of arrangement	Goal	Advantages and disadvantages
Total ban	Prohibits private military and security companies from operating in war and conflict situations	Difficult to enforce on extraterritorial basis; prohibits useful activities as well
Self-regulation	Adoption of a code of conduct	Easy to adopt; non-binding; 'black sheep' do not adhere to the code
Revision of the Geneva Convention	Regulation of activities of private military firms; ban on specific activities	Clarifies the status of companies and their employees in situations of war; unsatisfactory compromise likely, however
Licensing regime	Control of activities of private military firms; ban on specific activities	Only licensed companies permitted to operate; as with arms exports, does not preclude violations and scandals
Registration	Transparency with regard to companies' activities	More transparency; easy to manage; governments must take action to prohibit specific activities
International registration	Transparency and verification of activities	More transparency; problematical cases probably not covered
Blacklists	Sanctions against companies	Introduction possible with minimal bureaucracy, but monitoring is complex; 'naming and shaming' of black sheep; may prevent persistent offenders from attracting further business

Unless regulations are introduced, private military companies can only be held accountable by their clients and owners or shareholders. All the control mechanisms mentioned in the table above have flaws and trade-offs and are not easy to implement. In some cases, they require comprehensive controls, which, in turn, necessitate a sufficiently well-developed institutional structure. In order to go some way towards systematizing the current complexity, at a minimum, regulations of the type applicable to arms exports are required, although the rules on arms transfers highlight just how inadequate the legal bases are.

[41] The advantages and disadvantages and their varying national and international reach are elaborated in: Wulf 2010, 122-124.

3.3. Security of Development Aid Workers: Demanding Challenges

3.3.1. Increasing Incidents

The impact of insecurity on humanitarian and development operations is of growing concern to governments and organizations in this area of activity since the risk of casualties has consistently grown. Attacks against aid workers have sharply increased over the last few years. During the years 2008 and 2009, over 500 humanitarian and aid workers were attacked (260 in 2008 and 278 in 2009); 122 were killed in 2008 and 102 in 2009.[42] Most of these attacks were politically motivated and almost two thirds of the attacks in 2008 are believed to be the work of armed opposition groups. Of course, criminal motives (common banditry, kidnapping and ransom etc.) play an important role as well (Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenico 2009, 4-5).

Figure 4: Attacks on Aid Workers, 1997 – 2008



Source: Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenico (2009, 11); for the year 2009 UNICEF, quoted in Radtke (2010, 367).

The three most critical environments for aid work – Sudan (Darfur), Afghanistan and Somalia – accounted for more than 60% of all violent incidents and aid worker victims while the attack rate in most other countries has been decreasing in recent years (Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenico 2009, 4). A development agency representative considers the risk in the Eastern part of the DRC to be extremely high. "Some of our staff more or less follow the rebels in an effort to demobilize them. It is a breath-taking task for the organization to do something for their security."[43]

The fact that the major problems are concentrated in only a few extreme cases and that for all other countries the dangers have not increased is good news for aid organizations. But this still leaves them with important challenges.

The targets of such attacks are international governmental as well as non-

[42] Not included in this number are attacks against UN peacekeeping personnel.
[43] Interview with a representative of a German development agency.

governmental organizations; their international staff (expatriates), consultants and local staff have been attacked. While incidents have occurred in previous decades as well, the attitude of most organizations in the past was to deal with such attacks on an ad hoc basis. It was emphasized in an interview in our research project: "Actually German development cooperation has not thought much about the security of its staff in previous decades – it was not a central issue. It was hoped that nothing serious would happen and that we could rely on the Foreign Office's crisis management."[44] In the meantime, dangerous environments have become more common, especially politically motivated attacks after 9/11. Hence, development organizations have begun to take action in order to minimize the risks to their staff.

The German development organization KfW (banking group) focuses on three aspects in its security management: (1) crime (which is prevalent in a number of countries and regions), (2) internal political tensions (which have repercussions on the security situation) and (3) the increasing terrorist threat – and in addition – a possible fourth aspect: natural disasters (earthquakes etc.).[45]

3.3.2. Reactions of Humanitarian and Development Agencies

In principle, humanitarian and development agencies have different ways of minimizing risk at their disposal, all of which entail difficult trade-offs and involve tricky decisions.

First, most attractive to NGOs is a passive or 'soft' acceptance approach, namely emphasizing the humanitarian character of their work. Humanitarian organizations have made significant efforts to pursue an active acceptance approach by emphasizing their mandates and strict adherence to humanitarian principles and by reaching out to reliable local partners and forging agreements with potential aggressors. The success of this strategy is contested. Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenico (2009, 6) conclude on the basis of their elaborate database on incidents against aid workers: "The most recent evidence continues to show that even those agencies that make considerable efforts to disassociate themselves from political actors and project an image of neutrality have not been immune from attack…".

In an interview, the representative of a German NGO emphasized the necessity of working only with reliable local partners, a strategy that they have successfully pursued in countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan. "Our partner organizations have hundreds of employees who work on a decentralized basis in many parts of the country. They are increasingly at risk. They have experienced several incidents. In some cases, 50 persons were kidnapped and had to be freed in arduous negotiations." In the interview, he emphasized two additional aspects: firstly, that their partner organization is a strong and independent local NGO with its own structures and policies and in the case of the kidnapping, they, and not the German NGO, negotiated with the kidnappers. Secondly, the Afghan partner organization clearly states that not

[44] Interview with a representative of a German development organization during our research project.
[45] Interview with a KfW representative during our research project.

all of the attacks were carried out by the Taliban but that the government is responsible for a large number of the attacks, because the NGO programme interfered with the well-functioning drug trade in which governors are engaged.[46]

Nic Lee, Director of the Afghan NGO Safety Office, an independent NGO safety coordination project supported by the EU and the governments of Switzerland and Norway, assumes that armed opposition groups in Afghanistan "now see some self-interest in not attacking impartial NGOs as they are likely to attempt to instrumentalize our activities for their own purposes in the near future." In response to the changed security environment in Afghanistan, Lee reiterates point-blank to member organizations "the importance of not engaging in civil-military coordination activities."[47] A similar conclusion, although more cautiously formulated, comes from a representative of the development organization Welthungerhilfe: "Mixing of humanitarian and military mandates creates, in the view of most NGOs, great difficulties for the acceptance approach" (Radtke 2010, 369).

Stoddard and colleagues (Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenico (2009, 6) speculate that disassociation from the military or political actors is not a solution: "We would posit that aid organisations are being attacked not just because they are perceived to be *cooperating* with Western political actors, but because they are perceived as wholly a part of the Western agenda." The official (governmental) development organizations have no possibility of disassociating themselves from Western political actors even if they wanted to.

A *second*, more active, possibility for risk minimization is increased protection. Many organizations now have established security policies and procedures. GIZ, for example, has set up a crisis management unit ('Krisenleitstelle') and has appointed a full-time crisis manager ('Krisenbeauftragte/r'). KfW has established a crisis and emergency management system ('Krisen- und Notfallmanagement').[48] Most agencies stress the need for prevention, i.e. early recognition and evaluation of potential risks are required to pursue preventive action.[49] Many agencies have trained more staff in crisis and incident management, have offered specialized security training to more violence-exposed roles within their organization, and have developed handbooks or policy guidelines.

Most of these protective measures are, of course, required in the field. They range from personal behaviour (for example during travel or in and around the living quarters) to protection of property (offices and living quarters), to guidelines for

[46] Interviews in the course of the research project.
[47] Quarterly Data Report for the 1st quarter 2010, http://www.afgnso.org/2010Q/ANSO%20Quarterly%20Data%20Report%20(Q1%202010).pdf.
[48] See also the GTZ policy paper 'Personelle Sicherheit im Auslandseinsatz' with detailed guidelines on responsibilities, communication channels at headquarters and the field offices addressed to both international (expatriate) and local personnel. The GTZ/GIZ has established a Risk Management Office in Afghanistan and Nepal. The Afghanistan project, funded by the BMZ, was established for the benefit of other German development institutions as well: KfW, DED, Inwent, CIM and others with a total of about 1400 employees.
[49] Emphasized, for example, by KfW.

fieldwork (short-term information on field visits), to specially protected vehicles and armed protection. Agencies' policies had to be extended to partner organizations and even beneficiaries since even the recipients of aid have come under attack (for example, girls and women attempting to access education in Afghanistan).

All these measures drive up programme costs, and so far, there is little consistency in security budgeting. As a matter of fact, the general budgetary rules applied by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Development and Cooperation (BMZ) do not provide a specific budget line for security. Except for extreme cases, as in Afghanistan, security costs have to be budgeted within the regular country programme budget.[50] Others, like the World Bank, DFID or USAID, "have financing of security already more clearly arranged and have taken measures to improve security in their field programmes."[51]

A *third* type of reaction to minimizing security risks adopted in a number of cases is a low-profile approach with remote management of programmes. The idea is to manage programmes from the agency's central office in an attempt to ensure that aid and humanitarian assistance continue to reach beneficiaries. In such situations the agency withdraws or at least limits the international staff and shifts more or all responsibilities for programme implementation to local partners or local staff. The assumption is that local staff are less at risk than the highly visible expatriates. However, the attack rate against local employees of international aid organizations has increased as well in the most dangerous environments. In addition, development organizations worry that this could be understood as a negative signal both by partner organizations and their own team.[52] Such a decision therefore requires careful consideration. Most organizations emphasize that such an approach is at best a short-term measure and contradicts the above-mentioned 'acceptance' approach.

Fourth and finally, organizations have completely withdrawn from the dangerous environment, usually as a reaction to the killing of their aid workers. This means the end of aid delivery. Of course, this reaction remains the exception.

3.3.3. Inter-Agency Cooperation

Humanitarian and development organizations are faced with similar challenges and security concerns about their staff. This has led to cooperation among them in an effort to cope with insecurity. Following the recommendations by the UN-sponsored Inter-Agency Standing Committee, a Taskforce on Collaborative Approaches to Field Security was formed to explore ways of tackling the increasing insecurity in field missions. In 2006, a paper entitled 'Saving Lives Together. A Framework for Improving Security Arrangements Among IGOs, NGOs and UN in the Field' was

[50] The only study known to us on the cost of security for aid workers is Stoddard and Harmer (2010).
[51] Interview with a German development organization.
[52] Emphasized in an interview with a German development organization.

published.[53] The paper calls for the initiation of a dialogue with 'unconventional' interlocutors in zones of conflict and the establishment of a code of conduct. It also makes recommendations for action, and suggests pilot countries for collaborative action.

Different forms of networks have been established in several high-risk countries. Since the security situation in Afghanistan is so precarious, security issues can no longer be sidelined (de Graaff, Foster, Nijssen 2010). The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) was the first to be set up and is now used for other environments as a model. The network provides documentation on incidents and gives background information to NGOs on coping with the insecure situation.[54] A similar network, the Gaza Strip NGO Safety Office Project (GANSO) has been established as a CARE International project with the aim of providing relevant information and analysis to the NGO community in order to implement their projects safely.[55] The Somalia NGO Consortium, founded in 1999 in Nairobi as an NGO coordination body, has established the NGO Safety Programme, aimed at reducing risks to programme personnel operating in Somalia. It functions as a security focal point to ensure development of tailored security support services.[56] The European Interagency Security Forum (EISF) is a platform for security focal points from European humanitarian agencies operating internationally. It encourages NGOs to collectively improve security management practice.[57]

These networks have attracted wide participation by NGOs. One of the important aspects of security management is the documentation of incidents, so that lessons can be learned. This was strongly emphasized in one of our interviews and it was mentioned that it has taken a long time to find acceptance and funding for staff security-related issues.

[53] http://www.google.de/search?hl=de&source=hp&q=Saving+Lives+Together%3A+A+Framework+for+improving+Security+Arrangements+Among+IGOs%2C+NGOs+and+UN+in+the+Field&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&oq=&gs_rfai=.
[54] http://www.afgnso.org/.
[55] http://www.gaza-nso.org/?p=page&id=1.
[56] http://www.somaliangoconsortium.org/spas.php.
[57] http://www.eisf.eu/about/.

4. Conclusion

4.1. (In-)Security in Post-conflict and Post-war Contexts

The term post-conflict, taken verbatim, sends the wrong message for development cooperation, since neither conflict nor violence might be ended or reduced. While physical violence is not endemic in all 'post-conflict' countries, it is a problem in many of those societies beyond the relapse into armed conflict. These conflict-prone situations have important repercussions for development aid, which need to be taken into consideration in programming and implementation. Post-war and post-conflict environments are shaped by three factors which development cooperation must take into account, because they may either offer opportunities or create restrictions for its strategies and procedures:

a) *patterns of war or armed conflict termination* (military victory – agreements – phasing out) influence not only the overall stability of the environment but also available partner structures and thus the (im-)possibilities for alignment;

b) *the intensity and structure of war or conflict-related violence* (who was a perpetrator, who was a victim, where did violence happen?) must be taken into account as they are an important indicator for patterns of social cohesion (or their lack) and for the existence of insecurity (e.g. traumatization of specific social groups);

c) *the extent and form of post-war/post-conflict violence* (political – criminal – social) need to be disaggregated (who classifies violence and why?) as this is an important indicator for the overall perspectives of peace processes or war termination. At the same time, this analysis provides a basis for the development of intervention strategies as well as for prevention.

Thus one of the many challenging tasks in countries that have emerged from war is continued insecurity. The development community has increasingly addressed this issue (development-security nexus), has developed concepts (conflict sensitivity, post-conflict needs assessment) and implemented programmes and projects (specifically SSR, DDR, peace funds, risk assessment offices) to address security and conflict-relevant issues as well as peace stabilization processes.

It has been recognized by the international community that the initial post-conflict period in most countries is characterized by significant insecurity and political instability. Unfortunately, practical experience shows that this insecurity is often not limited to an initial period only. These findings must be acknowledged and taken into consideration in development cooperation programmes.

Understanding the complex causes and dynamics of post-war and post-conflict violence is a necessary precondition for developing adequate strategies to reduce and control violence. At the same time the framing of violence has to be analyzed according to the specific context, as it is highly dependent on the existing power relations, winners and losers. Taking patterns of violence and insecurity as a starting point, post-war and post-conflict societies can be differentiated along four patterns

that may be closely interrelated on the ground. Challenges and priorities for development cooperation and instruments will vary accordingly:

- a risk of relapse into armed conflict: providing incentives for stabilizing will be the priority e.g. incentives for DDR, supporting win-win situations not just for ex-combatants but at a societal level;
- development of new patterns of violence: supporting conflict-sensitive transformation processes, preventing and countering negative dynamics (e.g. the entanglement of old and new forms of violence);
- stagnation (neither war nor peace): creating incentives for violence reduction;
- significant reduction of violence: the relevant question for stability in this situation is how violence reduction is accomplished, as mere repression will not be sustainable in the long term.

4.2. Donor Approaches and Priorities

State-building has emerged in recent years as one of the central concepts of development assistance in post-war and post-conflict situations. The record of state-building in post-conflict recovery, however, is at best mixed. Quite frequently, state-building is not achieved and state institutions are too weak to enforce a state monopoly of force. It seems that the volatility of the state-building concept due to continued insecurity is often underestimated.

Regional organizations have increasingly been tasked with peace-building responsibilities and donors have assisted some of them to strengthen their capacities. Given the internal heterogeneity of some key regional organizations and their members (especially the divergences in political values), it seems that the regional organizations' actual potential in peacekeeping is somewhat overestimated.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR) are rightly considered an important aspect of development in order to stabilize the peace process and reduce or avoid violence. The reintegration of ex-combatants in particular has a rather mixed record of results. DDR has been only partly successful in reducing violence, and reintegration of ex-combatants has often failed due to limited employment opportunities. It is necessary to recognize the limitations of such programmes and find some sort of a balance in supporting former fighters and civilians affected by the violent conflicts.

Security sector reform (SSR) has been promoted strongly as a core development concept. This is largely based on normative concepts among the development community. SSR rightly aims to stabilize society, as stability is not possible without the security sector. However, the reform focuses on a sensitive area of governance as power relations are profoundly challenged. A few issues of security sector reform remain unresolved and require more attention from development cooperation, namely: a limited knowledge base on the success and failure of SSR (a systematic overall evaluation is needed), an uneven 'buy-in' into SSR policy (harmonization of policies is required), dilution of the SSR concept (not everything that is labelled SSR

is SSR in reality), differing donor interests, and non-development concepts sometimes framing the SSR agenda ('war on terror', arms exports).

Violence control in these contexts needs a second pillar based on civil conflict regulation and the empowerment of civil society organizations, most of all in relation to transparency and control of old, reformed or new state security forces.

Privatization of security has become a dominant trend in both conflict and post-conflict situations. The 'bottom-up' privatization of violence (warlords, spoilers, gangs etc.) is a particularly demanding challenge for development cooperation in post-conflict situations and the dilemma of finding the right partners is obvious. 'Top-down' privatization is deliberately planned through contracting private military and security firms. The responsible private security companies offer services that development agencies are looking for. However, the general trend of privatizing security is certainly not without problems since the necessary public control is lacking. Privatization of security services can undermine and often has undermined the state's monopoly of force. This policy contradicts the concept of creating efficient state institutions. There is a need to regulate the activities of such firms. It is recommended that development agencies develop criteria on when and where to hire and, in addition, take particular care when contracting such companies. The democratically-oriented reform of the security sector and the privatization of traditional military and police functions are two intrinsically contradictory concepts. The former attempts to strengthen the state's monopoly of force, while the latter delegates the state's functions to private actors without properly controlling them. Both concepts are applied in post-conflict countries.

A key decision for development programmes relates to the sensitive issue of timing and sequencing the priorities properly in the immediate aftermath of war or conflict, i.e. during the early phase of a peace process. It is important to decide if direct assistance to stabilize the peace process (for example in the form of assistance to ex-combatants or in establishing a peace fund) should be prioritized indirectly by delivering basic services such as food, water, health, infrastructure, etc. In most post-conflict settings, this is not an 'either or' decision; instead a balanced programme including both direct and indirect assistance to the peace process is required.[58]

Attacks on aid workers have increased considerably in recent years. Sixty percent of all incidents have occurred in only three countries (Afghanistan, Sudan/Darfur and Somalia). In most other countries, the security of aid workers is less at risk, although not without its challenges. Development agencies need to take this aspect seriously. Provisions for training of personnel, other protective measures (including establishment of crisis management systems, development of guidelines and toolkits) are essential. In addition, there is a need to address the security of aid workers from a general budgetary approach, so that appropriate action does not suffer from inflexible or insufficient budgets.

[58] The World Development Report suggests addressing security, justice and job creation first.

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Editor:

Lotharstraße 53 D - 47057 Duisburg
Phone +49 (203) 379 4420 Fax +49 (203) 379 4425
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